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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
KENNECOTT COPPEE CORPORATION, a corporation, and
Case. No.
8091

BINGHAM AND GARFIELD RAILWAY COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Defendant.

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF

JURISDICTION.
The decision of the defendant, which is here
the subject of review, was rendered on the 23rd day
of July, 1953. On the 18th day of August, 1953,
plaintiffs filed in this Court their Petition for Writ
of Certiorari to review and annul that decision.
Writ of certiorari issued out of this Court on the

i
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18th day of August, 1953, and was served upon the
defendant on that day. Pursuant to that writ,
defendant certified and filed with this Court the
proceedings and evidence taken in the case. The
jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Section
59-13-46, Utah Code 1953.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.
The questions presented are:
1. Whether in determining plaintiffs' State
Franchise Tax under Section 80-13-21(6) (c), Utah
Code 1943 (Sec. 59-13-20(6) (c), Utah Code 1953)
defendant may attribute to Utah, as the amount
of plaintiffs' gross receipts from business assignable to Utah, the gross receipts from sales of copper,
molybdenum, platinum and palladium produced by
its Utah Copper Division and sold outside of Utah.
2. Whether said State franchise taxes as imposed by the defendant, tax income from activities
beyond the jurisdiction of this State arid thus deprive plaintiffs of due process of law within the
meaning of Section 7 of Article I of the Constitution of Utah and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and
2
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unduly burdens interstate commerce in violation of
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, and Article I, Section
10, Clause 2 of the Constitution of the United
States; and whether the defendant's attempt to
impose and to exact payment thereof as a condition
to the continued conduct of plaintiffs' interstate
business within the State of Utah pursuant to the
prohibition of Sections 59-13-61 and 59-13-62, Utah
Code 1953, would burden interstate commerce.
3. Whether under Section 80-13-8(9) (a) (b),
Utah Code 1943, (Sec. 59-13-7(9) (a) (b), Utah Code
1953), for the purpose of the depletion deduction,
the term "net income from the property" means the
net income derived from the sale of the mineral
production obtained from the property less all costs
and expenses incurred in the production and sale
of such products.
4. Whether, for the calendar year 1942, the
defendant has either jurisdiction or authority but
to obey the mandate of this Court in its Case No.
7298 and whether the defendant's attempt to change
the allocation of Kennecott's net income within and
without the State of Utah for purpose of the State
franchise tax for that year, or otherwisa to exceed
or elaborate upon that mandate, is beyond its power
and void.
3
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5. Whether m the light of the facts disclosed
by this record the defendant is empowered to assess
interest on deficiencies, should any such be found.

STATEMENT
This suit is one to review the decision of the
defendant and its assessments thereunder of the
corporation franchise tax against these plaintiffs
for the years 1942 to 1950, both inclusive. The
plaintiff Bingham and Garfield Railway Company
was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the plaintiff Kennecott Copper Corporation (hereinafter sometimes
called "Kennecott"), and plaintiffs' return was a
joint return for each of the years 1942 to 1948,
inclusive; in each of 1949 and 1950 the return was
that of Kennecott Copper Corporation alone. Bingham and Garfield Railway Company ceased operation April 30, 1948, and was dissolved June 30,
L951, Kennecott Copper Corporation succeeding to
ill the Railway Company's assets and agreeing to
fulfill and discharge all contractural obligations of
the Railway Company. Whatever obligation, if any,
there be by reason of the corporate franchise tax
assessments here the subject of review will be Kennecott Copper Corporation's obligation solely.
Furthermore the matter here in issue pertains exclusively to the operation of Kennecott Copper corporation; therefore, the plaintiffs hereafter will be
referred to in the singular as Kennecott.

4
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The issue it* one of power or authority m the
defendant to proceed as by its decision below, under
the statutes and Constitution of the State of Utah
and the stated provisions of the Constitution of the
United States. The defendant State Tax Commission
(hereafter sometimes called the "Commission") is
created by statute and has only such powers as the
statute confers upon it. Such powers must be exercised in accordance with the statute. E. C. Olsen Co.
vs. State Tax Commission, 109 Utah 563 at 570, 168
P. 2d 324.
The defendant had before it some 700 pages of
oral testimony and a multitude of voluminous
exhibits. Numerous witnesses appeared for the
plaintiff. In not a single instance wras their testimoney contradicted. The facts as presented by
the plaintiffs witnesses are established without contradiction. The defendant was required to make
and should have made its finding of fact and have
rendered its decision upon the evidence before it. No
new or additional evidence may now be introduced,
but the cause is to be heard on the record before the
Commission as certified to by it. The decision of
the Commission may be reviewed by this Court both
upon the law and the facts. Section 59-13-46, Utah
Code 1953.
Because of the voluminous nature of the record,
we do not desire to burden this Court by pointing out
the many instances where the findings of fact by the
5
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defendant are not supported by the testimony and
evidence presented before it. Consequently, this
brief is based upon facts that are not in dispute
between the Commission and Kennecott because, on
the basis of such facts alone, Kennecott believes its
contentions are amply sustained.
F. 4, Ex.
49 (2),
Tr. 1G4
Ex.
24(2) 42(2)
Tr. 571
et seq.,
574
45,46,
48, 341

Kennecott is a New York State corporation
which, since its incorporation in 1915, has always
had its principal office and place of business in New
York City. During all years here under eonsideration this office was located at 120 Broadway, New
York City. These were the principal executive,
administrative and financial offices of the Corporation, where the Corporation's president and other
principal officers had their offices, where the Board
of Directors regularly held its meetings and where
there was located a large force of executives, administrative, accounting and clerical personnel. It was
from these offices in New York that Kennecott conducted and administered its extensive operations,
including its several directly-owned mining proper146 ties located in the State of Utah and in other parts
et seq., of the United States, and the affairs of its various
149 subsidiaries located in the United States and in
et seq. foreign countries. It was from these offices that
Kennecott conducted and controlled the sales of its
mineral products, including sales made by Kennecott Sales Corporation (a wholly-owned subsidiary
of Kennecott organized under the laws of New
6
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155,169
Ex.
41(2),
42(2)
575

342

York), as agent for Kennecott. It was in a part of
the space rented by Kennecott for its offices at 120
Broadway that the Kennecott Sales Corporation
(hereinafter sometimes called the "Sales Corporation") had its office and place of business.

Kennecott followed a divisional method of accounting for its various operations and affairs. One
of these divisions was the so-called Utah Copper
Division which covered the operations of Kennecott
with respect to its Utah properties and the further
processing and ultimate sale of the products of such
properties. The Utah Copper Division thus covered
the activities conducted by or in connection with
Kennecott's properties, offices and business within
the State of Utah, and those in relation thereto conducted by or in connection with its head office in
New York. The Commission has held, and Kennecott
in this case does not dispute, that the tax returns
of Kennecott for the Utah corporation franchise tax
and the tax determinations to be made for purposes
of that tax relate only to such part of the activities
and income of Kennecott as is represented by its
Utah Copper Division, excluding from such tax
returns and such determinations the income or
affairs of other divisions of Kennecott, Accordingly,
in this case, it is understood that unless clearly
indicated to the contrary, reference to Kennecott
and its operations and affairs relate solely to those
7
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included under the broad designation set out in this
paragraph as the Utah Copper Division,
in Utah, Kennecott is the owner of and operates
the Utah Copper Mine and a precipitating plant in
Bingham Canyon, in Salt Lake County, Utah, and
is the owner of and operates two ore concentrators
at Magna and Arthur, respectively, both being in
the vicinity of the settlement of Magna, also in Salt
Lake County, Kennecott is also the owner of and
F. 10,12 operates certain transportation facilities between its
Tr. 43, mine and concentrators and between the concen131-2 trators and the smelter of the American Smelting
and Refining Company at Garfield, in Salt Lake
County, Utah.
Ex.
iii (2),
18(2),
19(2)
Tr. 44,
165, 267

To recover the metals, most precipitates and all
copper concentrates must be smelted, the metals
being thus converted into what is known as blister
copper. Kennecott delivered its precipitates and
concentrates to various smelters at various locations,
some 'within the State of Utah and some in states
other than the State of Utah, and for a negotiated
fee those smelters performed their operation as a
bailee for Kenneeott's account. Almost all of the
copper concentrate during the taxable years involved was shipped to and smelted at the nearby
Garfield, Utah smelter of American Smelting and
Refining Company (hereinafter sometimes called
"A.S.&B.").
8
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166, 208
Ex.
iii(2),
Tr. 43,
138,166,
216, 268

F. 11,
Tr. 44-5,
53,146,
179,186,
207, 213,
336, 339,
620

The blister copper resulting from the smelting
operation contains the copper and other metals,
which, to produce a commercially marketable product, must be refined so that the refined metals will
be separated one from the other. There being no
refinery within the State of Utah,* refining was
performed in states other than Utah, for the most
part by A. S. & E. at its eastern refineries located
at Baltimore, Maryland and Perth Amboy, New
Jersey, always for a negotiated fee and as a bailee
for Kennecott's account. Transportation from the
smelters to the refineries was by Kennecott as the
shipper and over the trans-continental railroads at
published tariff rates. After refining, the refined
metals were delivered to Kennecott in states other
than Utah.
There was no market in the State of Utah for
any part of Kennecott's production, either unrefined
or refined; Kennecott in fact produced no commercial product in Utah other than molybdenite coneentrates and a relatively small quantity of precipitates, all of which, however, were sold by the Sales
Corporation, as agent for Kennecott, in states other
than Utah for delivery to buyers located outside
Utah. Net income being the end and necessary result

* Kennecott's refinery in Utah began operations in
October 1950, but since its production was insig45,180
nificant in the period here involved the parties
have mutually disregarded it.
9
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of its operation, Kennecott was required to find and
develop in states other than Utah the required market for its production, and Kennecott did find and
develop such market in states other than Utah and
in those states sold and distributed its production
on the open market and completed its operation by
converting its production into money or income in
those states other than Utah.
Kennecott's operation in and out of the State
of Utah was one continuous, indivisible, closely integrated operating unit, the single ultimate purpose of
which was the production and sale of mineral prod51
ucts. Only the mining of the crude ores, coneentraet seq. tion and smelting, if smelted in Utah, were accomplished within the State of Utah; but the necessary
processes of smelting, where smelted outside Utah,
and refining and the sale, distribution and delivery
of all refined metals wherever refined, were accomplished wholly outside Utah. The operation was
indivisible, continuous and uninterrupted from the
mining of the crude ores within the State of Utah,
to and including the realization of the first commercially marketable product and the sale, distribution and delivery thereof outside of and beyond
339 Utah.
Kennecott's operation within and outside Utah
was an unitary business for which the "Massachusetts" formula as embodied in Section 80-13-21(6),
256, 259 Utah Code 1943, (Sec. 59-13-20 (6), Utah Code 1953),
10
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was devised and, as in many others of the states, was
adopted by Utah. The parties are here in agreement
that this statutory formula is to be applied in this
ease. They are also in agreement upon the manner
of calculating and applying the first and second
factors of that formula — (6) (a) and (b) — with
respect to property and payroll. The only question
between the parties relating to the application of
this statutory formula is regarding the manner of
determining the third factor — (6) (c) and (6) (e)
(1st) — with respect to gross receipts and the manner in which sales made without the State of Utah
are to be assigned in computing that factor; which
is Question 1 here presented. Question 3 here presented with respect to depletion affects determination of the total net income subject to allocation but
does not affect determination of the third factor (6)
(c) assigning gross receipts to business transacted.
Kennecott Sales Corporation was and is a corEx.
poration of the State of New York, a wholly-owned
51(2), subsidiary of Kennecott, created by Kennecott to
164 perform the function of selling Kennecott's production. The only business office of the Sales Corporation was located at, was embraced within and was
actually included in and was a part of the premises
rented by Kennecott, constituting Kennecott's principal place of business, being that in the Equitable
630 Building at No. 120 Broadway in New Y'ork City.
The Sales Corporation at all the times herein involved acted as Kennecott's agent in negotiating
11
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Trans.

..: • . : -and effecting sales of the copper and molybdenite
:
produced by Kennecott from its Copper Mine in
. ;.;'.
Utah and performed that function in accord with
policies determined by Kennecott and obedient to
the direction and instructions given to it by Kenne615-6 cott from its principal office in New York. No title
Ex.
to these products ever passed to the Sales CorporaQQQ tion; on the contrary title remained at all times in
(2), Kennecott until delivery of the product to purP. 49, chasers. The product was never consigned to the
171,172, Sales Corporation, nor was the Sales Corporation
175, 219, ever in possession of the product it sold. The Sales
216, 609 Corporation was not engaged in any manner of business within the State of Utah.
Until delivery of the refined copper to buyers
outside of Utah, the refined metal was held for
Kennecott by the refineries located outside of this
State, Kennecott's shipment being made of specified
tonnages in specific shapes to particular points as
170
directed by the Sales Corporation upon the authority
of Kennecott and on Kennecott's behalf. Molybdenite was produced in Utah and delivered therefrom
to buyers in states other than Utah on instruction
179,187 from the Sales Corporation, again for and on behalf
of Kennecott and by Kennecott's authority.

- Ex.
iii(2),
Platinum and palladium were sold by A. S. & R,
Art. 10, for Kennecott's account and as Kennecott's agent.
p.. 14
.
12
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Gold and silver were sold from Kenneeott's
principal place of business in New York City directly
546-565 by Kennecott to and were purchased by the refineries.
The relative importance of the sales of the
mineral products is indicated by the following summary of the percentages of the total dollar sales
during the years 1942 to 1950, inclusive:
(a) Sales by Kennecott Sales
Corporation as agent for
Kennecott:
Copper
......79.79%
Molybdenite
8.00
Total for copper and
molybdenite
87.79%
(b) Sales directly by Kennecott
to A.S. & R :
Gold
.....10.18%
Silver
2.02
Total for gold and silver
(c) Sales by A.S. & R. as agent
for Kennecott:
Platinum and palladium....
Total sales

12.20

.01
100%

The Commission's decision attributed to business assigned outside Utah, receipts from sales of
gold and silver, and these sales are not in issue in
13
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this case. Since sales of platinum and palladium
constituted only a small fraction of 1% of total sales
(approximately $96,000 in the aggregate) during
the taxable years involved, our discussion of the
third or gross receipts factor, will primarily relate
to the sales of copper and molybdenite.

Varying Positions Taken by the Commission
For an understanding of this case and its record as it now comes before this Court, it seems
necessary to note the various and inconsistent positions which the Commission has taken with Kennecott over a period of years with respect to
(a)

the allocation of net income within and without the State for the purpose of this tax,
and

(b)

the determination of depletion allowable.

1. For 1941 and prior years (before the years
1942 to 1950, inclusive, which are involved in the
present controversy), the Commission had consistently applied the statutory formula for allocation
and in determining the sales factor of such statutory
formula had recognized that all sales of the mineral
products were without the State of Utah and were
not to be brought into the numerator in determining
the allocation fraction. Depletion, as a deduction
from total net income before allocation within and
14
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without the State, had also been consistently determined by the Commission at 33%% of the entire net
income from the sales of the mineral products without use of any algebraic formula or otherwise
excluding any part of the income from such mineral
products as not subject to percentage depletion.
The returns filed by Kennecott for 1942 and
subsequent years followed in these particulars the
same standards as before for allocation of income
in accordance with the statutory formula and for
computing depletion on the entire net income from
the mineral product.
2. The Commission in its March 10, 1945 proposed adjustments with respect to the 1942 tax first
applied an algebraic formula for determination of
the net income from the property as the basis for
the depletion computation. (This formula will be
discussed in Point II of this brief.) However, the
allocation of net income to the State of Utah was
made on the basis of the statutory formula attributing all sales of mineral products outside the State
of Utah.
This was the basis for the determination of the
1942 tax as that case was then brought before this
Court, Kennecott Copper Corporation v. State Tax
Commission, 221 P. 2d 857 (1950).
15
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A particular issue in that case was whether
Federal income and excess profits taxes should be
deducted in computing net income for purposes of
depletion. This Court decided that they should be
so deducted and that issue was definitely determined and so is not an issue now pending before
this Court. Such taxes have been so deducted in
the determinations for the years 1942 to 1950 which
are now before this Court and Kennecott raises no
contrary contention in this respect.
This Court did not in that case pass on the
question of the use of the algebraic formula and
method for determining depletion but remanded the
case to the Commission for further determination.
No question was there raised by Kennecott, the
Commission or the Court as to the use of the statutory formula for allocation of income within and
without the State, nor as to the computation thereof.
3.

The Commission in 1951 presented in a

series of amended reports its revised determinations
for 1942 and for all subsequent years to 1950 inclusive. In such determinations, it continued to apply
the algebraic formula for the depletion computation.
However, for the first time instead of applying the
statutory

formula,

it

substituted

its

algebraic

formula to determine that portion of the Utah Copper Division's net income from mineral production
to be allocated within the State of Utah for taxation.
16
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It was m respect to these reports for the years
1942 to 1950, inclusive, and the computations thus
made as to depletion allowable and income allocable
to the State of Utah, that Kennecott filed its several
petitions for redetermination of deficiencies and
thus instituted the Commission's hearings below.
4. The hearings with respect to such determinations wTere opened December 4, 1951 and proceeded on this basis until April 2, 1952. At that
time, the Commission again changed its position
and presented its new determinations in its Exhibit
P P P ( 2 ) (Tr. 432). In these revised determinations,
the Commission acknowledged that the statutory
allocation formula was to be applied in the allocation of income in place of a determination based on
its algebraic formula which it had applied in its
1951 determinations and which had theretofore been
the subject of the hearings. It, however, still adhered to the use of the algebraic formula in determining depletion. This explains the reason for considerable testimony and argument in the record of
the hearings directed to the use of the algebraic
formula for determining income allocation which
is now no longer pertinent to the issues, under the
changed position of the Commission.
The Commission, however, in applying the
statutory formula for allocating income to the State
of Utah adopted a new theory, never before applied
or suggested by it since enactment of the franchise
17
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tax, under which it ascribed gross receipts from all
sales of metallic products, even though made by or
in connection with the principal office of the corporation in the State of New York, as being gross
receipts attributable to business carried on within
the State of Utah. It was this point which was
particularly dealt with in the hearings as they thereafter continued before the Commission.
5. The Commission in its decision below somewhat modified the position taken in its revised
demand presented during the course of the hearings
and attributed gross receipts from sales of gold and
silver to business carried on without the State of
Utah. However, it continued to hold that gross
receipts from sales of the other mineral products
were to be attributed to business carried on within
Utah, even though there was no question but that
such sales were made entirely without the State of
Utah and that none of such sales were to customers
located in the State of Utah. The major question
relative to such other products involved the sales
of copper and molybdenite. These sales were made
on behalf of Kennecott by the Sales Corporation, its
wholly-owned subsidiary, as sales agent of Kennecott from or in connection with the principal office
of Kennecott in the State of New York. A minor
question involved was as to sales of platinum and
18
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palladium sold by A. S. & R. as agent for Kennecott
pursuant to agreement made in and supervised
from New York and connected with the principal
office of Kennecott in the State of New York.
After this long extended history and frequent
and material changes by the Commission of its position, the questions which now come before this Court
as to these matters are with respect to the propriety
of:
1.

The Commission's determination of the sales
factor to be applied in allocation of the total
net income in accordance with the statutory
formula; and,

2.

The Commission's method of determining
depletion deductible in computing such total
net income, including its use of the algebraic
formula for that purpose.

ARGUMENT
I
Point
Receipts from sales of products produced by Kennecott's Utah Copper Division were not gross receipts
from business done in Utah and cannot be attributed
to business carried on within Utah nor included in the
numerator of the gross receipts factor as from business
assignable to Utah; and, if the franchise tax statute
were to be interpreted and applied as determined by
the Commission, it would be unconstitutional.
19
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:

The question discussed in this portion of the
brief involves the proper construction, as applied to
the facts in this case, of Section 80-13-21 of the Utah
Code of 1943, (Sec. 59-13-20, Utah Code 1953)
(originally enacted in 1931 and in effect during all
of the years in question) and the constitutionality
of that section if construed as the Commission has
construed it.
The Franchise Tax Act imposes an annual
franchise tax for the privilege of doing business in
this State in any year in an amount equal to 3% of
the net income of the corporation for the preceding
year "computed and allocated to this State in the
manner hereinafter provided." Laws of Utah 1931,
Ch. 39, Section 4, as amended by Laws of Utah 1935,
Ch. 89, Section 80-13-3 (Sec. 59-13-3, Utah Code
1953).
Section 80-13-21, Utah Code 1943, (Sec. 59-1320, Utah Code 1953) sets forth the rules for determining the portion of net income assignable to business done within Utah, upon which the tax is based.
The statute first specifies rules relating to allocation within or without the State of certain items
such as rents, interest, dividends, and gains and
losses from sale of capital assets. Then subsection
6 specifies the statutory "three-factor" allocation
formula applicable to the remainder of its net income if the corporation carries on any business outside of Utah. In the formula equal weight is given
20
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to three separate ' f a c t o r s v ( a ) : tangible property
within the State, (b) payroll assignable to the State,
and (c) gross receipts from business assignable to
the State. The specific language of the gross receipts
factor is as follows;
(e) The amount of the corporation's gross
receipts from business assignable to this State
shall be the amount of its gross receipts for the
taxable year from
(1st) Sales, except those negotiated or
effected in behalf of the corporation by agents
or agencies chiefly situated at, connected with
or sent out from premises for the transaction
of business owned or rented by the corporation
outside this state, and sales otherwise determined by the tax commission to be attributable
to the business conducted on such fjremises,
In determining that portion of the net income of
Kennecott's Utah Copper Division assignable to
business done within this State, the Commission by
its decision below attributed to business carried on
within Utah, in purported compliance with the above
"gross receipts" factor of the allocation formula, all
of the gross receipts from all of the sales of copper,
molybdenite, platinum and palladium of the Utah
Copper Division, although all of suqh sales were
made outside of Utah to buyers located outside of
1
this State by agents operating from offices outside
'.*.: of this-State, As a< result,-the.Commission arrived
. ~i
'fite-to allocaiian to Ut^h ...odL'such gross-receipts
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ranging from approximately 83% to 89% for such
years. When combined with the other allocation
factors prescribed by the statute, this resulted in an
allocation to Utah of from approximately 90% to
94% of the total net income of the Utah Copper
Division.
Kennecott contends that none of such gross
receipts from sales outside of this State should be
attributed to business carried on within Utah in
applying the gross receipts factor; such gross receipts are the result of business carried on in a
state other than Utah. As a result the numerator
of the gross receipts factor should be substantially
zero and the resulting percentages of net income
allocated to Utah would range from approximately
63% to 65%.
The Commission attributed all of the gross
receipts from sales of gold and silver to business
done outside of Utah, and with this Kennecott is in
agreement. As indicated above, the sales of platinum
and pallidium are but an infinitesimal part of the
total gross receipts here involved. Accordingly, the
statements made hereafter in this Brief will relate
only to the sales of copper and molybdenite, except
where otherwise indicated, and the argument will
be addressed primarily to those sales.
As we believe the argument which follows
clearly demonstrates, the Commission in so applying the formula prescribed by the statute dis*
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regarded both the purpose and the letter of the
statute and, if the statute is to be applied in the
manner in which the Commission has applied it, the
resulting tax on Kennecott would be in violation of
the Federal and State constitutions as a denial of
due process of law and an undue burden on interstate commerce.
A.

In the case of a corporation doing business both
within and outside the State of Utah, the franchise
tax statute is designed to tax only the portion of
the corporation's net income fairly and reasonably
attributable to the business done by it within the
State of Utah. The decision of the Commission
produces a result obviously at variance with this
cardinal purpose of the law.

The Utah franchise tax statute, like that in a
number of other states, is one embodying the socalled Massachusetts formula — a three-factor
formula — for the purpose of determining the portion of the net income of a corporation engaged in
business both within and without Utah to be taxed
under the statute. Before discussing the specific
wording of the statutory formula and showing how
the Commission's decision is contrary thereto, it is
appropriate at the outset to consider the purpose of
the statute and to show how the decision of the Commission is at variance with this purpose.
The purpose of the Utah statute, as with all
such apportionment laws, is to impose the State
Franchise Tax on only so much of the net income of
23
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a corporation as is fairly and reasonably attributable to business done within the state. Such a
standard is necessary to meet constitutional considerations. It is also desirable in the enlightened
self-interest of this State so as not to discourage
domestic corporations from extending their activities beyond the boundaries of the state, nor to discourage foreign corporations from prosecuting their
activities within the state. To accord with that purpose, orderly administration and fairness to taxpayers require the establishment of reasonable rules
or methods of allocating income from activities
within and activities without the state.
The State of Massachusetts had faced this problem earlier than did Utah and in order to meet such
purpose in 1920 adopted a three-factor formula for
allocation of total net income on the basis of property, of payroll and of sales or other gross receipts
within and without the state. This was done in
recognition of the fact that no single factor could
be generally applied to give a fair allocation of
business incomes which arose under many varied
circumstances and conditions; and in the belief that
those three factors would give a reasonable standard of measurement generally applicable to meet
the purpose and intent of the statute. The experience of Massachusetts with this formula and the
further consideration of the problem in other states
had led many states to adopt this so-called "Massa-
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Trans.

chusetts formula" as the basis for their taxation,
—with some differences in its specifications in one
state or another, and with some states writing their
specifications directly into the law and some few
other states leaving the specifications to be prescribed by administrative authority. The Utah
statute, adopted in 1931, included the specific provisions which we shall later discuss, but not intending these as arbitrary rules which, contrary to the
purpose and intent of the statute, would allocate to
the state income which was not fairly and reasonably attributable to business carried on within the
state.
It is clear from the statute itself, from its legis109 lative history, and also from the opinions of this
etseq. Court construing it that the purpose of the Utah
Legislature in adopting the franchise statute was
to tax only such income as is reasonably attributable
to business done in Utah. Thus, Section 80-13-3
Utah Code 1943 (Sec. 59-13-3, Utah Code 1953) imposes a franchise tax upon net income "computed
and allocated to this state," and Section 80-13-21
Utah Code 1943 (Sec. 59-13-20 Utah Code 1953)
which prescribes the specific statutory apportionment formula, begins as follows:
-The-portion of net income assignable to business done within this State, and which shall be
the basis and measure of the tax imposed by this
25
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chapter, may be determined by an allocation upon
the basis of the following rules: . . ." (Italics supplied.)
The Utah statute provides in Paragraph (6) for an
allocation based on the three factors of property,
payroll and gross receipts, each of which is given
equal weight in the final result. In addition, it provides in Paragraph (8) for a different method of
allocation when, in a particular case, even this broad
formula does not give a fair and proper result in
that it allocates to Utah more or less than "the proportion of net income fairly and equitably attributable to this State" or when necessary to avoid
"double taxation".
The Report of the Tax Revision Commission of
the State of Utah in the year 1929 with respect to
the State franchise tax then in the process of formulation, contains the following statement at pages
67 and 6S under the heading, "The Allocation of Net
Income:"
"Since the basis of this tax is to be the net
income from the business done within the State,
it becomes necessary to provide for a distribution
or allocation of the net income of any business
concern among the several states in which it does
business. No state has the right to tax the capital
employed or the business done beyond its borders." (Italics supplied.) (Tr. 109)
The legislative intent to tax only income reasonably attributable to business done in Utah has been
specifically recognized by this Court. In California
26
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Packing Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 97 Utah
367, 93 P. 2d 463 (1939), this Court stated (93 P.
2d at 465 and 467-68):
". .. In providing for the determination of the
amount of the net income to be used as the basis
for computation of the franchise tax, the Legislature carefully distinguished between business
done within the state and business done outside
the state, so as to confine the operation of the
tax to business done within the State."
". . . The language of the statute throughout
evidences an intent only to determine the franchise tax from income from busines done under
the franchise from the state, that is business done
within the state. The various methods of allocation are designed to restrict the tax to business
done within the state and to assign to the state
for taxation that portion of the business reasonably attributable to the state. There is also
apparent a purpose to avoid double taxation."
A fair and reasonable apportionment of the net
income was thus intended by the statute and is
required by it.
However, as we feel is indicated by the Commission's repeated change in position during the
course of these proceedings (see pp. 14-19, supra)
and by the more detailed discussion of its present
position which follows, the Commission has apparently not been concerned with arriving at a fair
and reasonable apportionment to Utah of Kennecott's net income from the product of its Utah mines.
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On the contrary^ the Commission has seemingly
attempted, in derogation of the fundamental purpose
of the statute and by recourse to a tortured and, we
believe, entirely unjustified construction of its language, to allocate to Utah the largest possible
amount of net income.
The Commission made no attempt to determine
whether the result it reached was a fair one. In
Finding No. 69, page 163, it said: "It is not the
function or prerogative of the Commission to
attempt to evaluate, by its own judgment, the relative significance to the production of income of the
Utah Division of mining and other operations in
Utah as against the executive operations in New
York. It is the Commission's function only to determine the facts; the statute then determines the portion of net income assignable to business done within
the State."
The apportionment formula contained in the
Utah statute is premised on the principle that where
a single or unitary business is conducted across state
lines, a fair and reasonable apportionment of the
net income of the entire operation can be obtained
only by giving weight to three factors carefully
selected to reflect the property ownership and the
activities which produce such income—namely property^ payroll and gross receipts. Three factors are
used, since each factor operates as a check and balance to the others to prevent an extreme or unfair
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result which might occur if only one or two factors
were used. Accordingly, unless all such factors are
fairly applied and given full effect the whole basis
of the three-factor formula is negated.
In this case, the Commission attributed to Utah
substantially all of the property (approximately
94% over the years in question) and payroll (approximately 97%), as to which no objection is made
by Kennecott. It also attributed to business carried
on within Utah all of the gross receipts from the
sales of the products of the Utah Copper Division
(other than gold and silver) although admittedly
none of such sales were negotiated or made within
this State, none of the persons concerned with sales
worked out of offices within this State, none of such
products were delivered to customers within this
State, and, in fact, no sales activities of any character were carried on within this State. The effect of
such allocation is an overall apportionment of net
income to Utah ranging from 90% to 94% during
the taxable years involved. Such a result patently
violates the intent of the apportionment statute
when viewed in relation to the very substantial
activities occurring outside of Utah in connection
with the production of the net income from the Utah
Copper Division.
As evidence of such out-of-Utah activities, we
need cite only a few of the Commission's own findings as follows:
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P. 23

(a) Kennecott directs its industrial enterprise, including the operation of the Utah Copper
Division, from its permanent executive headquarters in New York.

P. 24

(b) Such executive offices in New York keep
constantly in touch with and coordinate all operational matters relating to mining, smelting, refining and selling to the end that Kennecott's farflung industrial enterprises throughout the United States and the world will move forward as one
united cohesive venture, the ultimate goal of w^hich
is to mine and treat the ore and sell the products
at a profit.

P. 24

(c) The duties and function of Kennecott's
headquarters in New York are many and varied
both in respect to relations with operators in the
field, relations within itself and general relations
with the public and the outside world.

P. 24

(d) The activities of Kennecott's headquarters in New York relate generally to operational, development, purchasing and selling matters.

P. 16

(e) All of the refining of copper, resulting
in the production of marketable copper, gold,
silver, platinum and palladium, occurred outside
of Utah.,

(f) All sales and deliveries to purchasers
P. 11, of copper and molybdenite by the Sales CorporaTr. 28, tion on behalf of Kennecott were made outside of
51,52 Utah.

P, 53

(g) All sales and deliveries to purchasers
of platinum and palladium by A. S. & R. in behalf
of Kennecott were made outside of Utah.
30
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Tran&.

F. 54

(h) All sales and deliveries to A. S. & R. of
gold and silver by Kennecott were made outside
of Utah.

It is perfectly apparent from the foregoing and
Tr. 45 from the undisputed testimony in the proceeding,
3t seq., that the activities of Kennecott outside of the State
146 of Utah were both necessary and substantial and but
et seq. for them the operation of the Utah Copper Division
would not have been carried on successfully over
the years involved. Although more detailed facts
could readily be adduced from the record, the above
findings of the Commission suffice to reveal, we
believe, how unreasonable and unrealistic is the decision of the Commission in attributing to Utah approximately 93% of net income from the sales of
mineral products.
The error of the Commission lies in the fact
that, in disregard of the legislative intent, it has
inequitably attributed to Utah sales in no way
related thereto. Consequently, the primary purpose
and intent of the statutory formula is defeated. In
the present case all of the products are sold outside
of Utah, whereas the property and payroll were for
almost all of the years 94% and 97%, respectively,
attributed to Utah. The factual circumstances thus
present a typical example of the necessity of a fair
application of all factors of the three-factor formula,
in order that thereby the gross receipts or sales
factor may operate to alleviate an otherwise unreasonable attribution of net income to one jurisdiction.
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As if they were talking about the present case,
Altaian and Keesling, Allocation of Income in State
Taxation (2d ed. 1950), explain the purpose of the
sales factor in the Massachusetts formula as follows
(p. 129):
" . . . it is believed that a fairly satisfactory
apportionment can be made if the purpose of the
use of the sales factor is kept in mind, namely, to
balance the property and payroll factors by giving weight to the elements not reflected by those
factors and thereby to assist in making a reasonable apportionment of the entire income among
the states in which the business is conducted."
The Commission in its decision, contrary to the
above quoted principles, has achieved an inequitable
and unsupportable result by attributing the gross
receipts from the sales to business carried on in
Utah in which, admittedly, none of the sales were
made and none of the selling activities in relation
thereto took place.
An example of the inequity resulting from the
failure to obtain a fair balance by the use of different factors is the case of Hans Rees' Sons, Inc.
v. North Carolina, 283 U. S. 123, 51 S. Ct. 385, 75
L. ed. 879 (1931). In that case the Supreme Court
held unconstitutional a state tax based upon net
income because the apportionment formula, as
applied to the particular facts, operated to tax
profits not attributable to transactions within the
jurisdiction. This case will be discussed subse32
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quently from its constitutional aspect. The important point here is that the North Carolina statute
utilized only a property factor which resulted for
most of the years involved in an allocation of over
80% of net income to that state. The sales office
was located in New York and sales were made
throughout the United States (including North
Carolina) and abroad. The Supreme Court held it
unnecessary to review the evidence in detail, holding that, in any aspect of the evidence, the statutory method unreasonably and arbitrarily attributed
to North Carolina a percentage of income out of all
appropriate proportion to the business transacted
there.
In general, m the case of a manufacturing or
mining, corporation, such as Kennecott, the payroll
factor tends to follow the property factor with respect to allocation to the state of income from
manufacture or mining. Hence, if any substantial
portion of such a corporation's income is to be
attributed to another state or states in which the
vital and important selling, executive and management activities are carried on, it is necessary to
employ and give weight to a sales factor. The use
of such factor was, obviously, the lacking element
in the Hans Bees' case, which caused the statute to
reach an unconscionable result.
The misuse of the sales factor by the Commission in the present case has achieved substantially
the same result as if it had applied only a two-factor
33
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

formula of property and payroll. Altaian and Keesling, supra, after summarizing the necessity of
utilizing a sales factor, state the proper basis for its
application as follows (pp. 126-27):
"The reasons for the use of the sales factor
afford a clue to the solution of the problem of
how sales should be apportioned. If the reason
for the use of the factor is to balance the other
two factors, then obviously the sales should be
apportioned in such a manner as to offset rather
than aggravate the effects of the property and
the payroll factors. This consideration rules out
the use of a number of the possible methods of
apportioning sales.
"Thus, apportionment of sales to the state
where the goods are manufactured or produced
obviously tends in many situations to emphasize
further the activities in the state of manufacture,
which are already overemphasized by the property factor and possibly also by the payroll
factor."
This reasoning applies directly to the present
case. Here the obviously unreasonable result obtained by the Commission by attributing all of the
sales of copper, molybdenite, platinum and palladium to Utah clearly demonstrates the soundness
of Kennecott's position and the propriety of an allocation which assigns to business outside of Utah
sales admittedly negotiated and made outside of the
State.
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The foregoing demonstrates the unreasonableness of the result reached by the Commission's decision. We shall now show that its decision cannot be
sustained under a proper interpretation and application of the specific language of Subsection 6 of
Sec. 59-13-20, Utah Code 1953, prescribing the formula for assigning gross receipts.
B. The Commission erroneously construed and applied
the specific provisions of the statute with respect
to the gross receipts factor by assigning to Utah
business which in its entirety was carried on in
other states.
1.

The gross receipts factor is designed to allocate to Utah only gross receipts from business
assignable to this State. The decision of the
Commission contravenes this basic legislative
intent*

As is admitted by the Commission in its Findings, all of the gross receipts from the sale of copper,
molybendite, platinum and palladium derived by
Kennecott from the Utah Copper Division resulted
from sales made entirely outside the State of Utah
to buyers located outside the State and through
persons operating at or from offices permanently
located outside the State. No selling activities of
any character took place in Utah or were carried on
by persons within or operating from or under the
supervision or direction of Kennecott's offioe zmthin

this State.
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In spite of these facts, the Commission has
attributed to Utah all of the gross receipts from such
sales solely on the ground that, in its view, such
sales were not made in Kennecott's name by Kennecott's own employees at Kennecott's own offices outside the State but were made through corporations,
which it characterized as "factors" or "commission
merchants," operating in their own behalf from their
own premises located outside the State. Accordingly, under the Commission's interpretation of the
statute, the amount of the numerator of the gross
receipts factor does not depend upon whether the
sales were, in fact, made out of the State, or by
Kennecott's employees or agents connected with a
permanent place of business of Kennecott outside
the State, or whether the sales were in fact attributable to Kennecott's offices outside the State.
The statute may not properly be construed as
the Commission has applied it. This we believe
evident from the opinions of this Court in the California Packing case, cited supra. In that case this
Court was called upon to construe the provisions of
the statute dealing with the gross receipts factor.
While the Court was divided as to the manner in
which the provisions relating to the gross receipts
factor were to be read, it is clear from both opinions
(i) that none of the Judges considered the provisions as authorizing the use in the numerator of
sales not* made within the State or by personnel not
operating from offices within the State or otherwise
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not related to sales activities within the State, and
(ii) that if the statute be otherwise construed serious questions as to its constitutionality would be
•raised. •
• •••v.';."::r~. :
Moreover, the Commission's construction of the
gross receipts factor violates the clear intent of the
statutory language. The basic intent of the statute
to allocate to Utah only net income reasonably and
fairly assignable to business done within Utah is
reflected not only in its general provisions but also
in the gross receipts factor itself. Thus, Paragraph
6(e) (quoted on p. 21) seeks to ascertain "the
amount of the corporations, -gross receipts from,
business assignable to this •state ..:..--..." (Italics
added). The. paragraph then assigns to Utah the
gross receipts from sales:
"."".• . except those negotiated or effected in
behalf of the corporation by agents or agencies
chiefly situated at, connected with or sent out
from premises for the transaction of business
owned or rented by the corporation outside this
state .'..".
The Commission's decision is predicated, as will be
discussed subsequently, upon an erroneous and narrow interpretation of the above "except" clause.
And it completely disregards the next clause in the
statute which also excepts from assignment to Utah:
"..... . sales otherwise, determined by the tax
commission to be attributable to the business conducted on such premises."
-'•* *:; a ;'
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It is submitted that however technical an interpretation be given to the initial language of the
"except" clause in Paragraph 6(e), the concluding
language was clearly designed to attribute to business carried on outside Utah sales not fairly attributable to Utah but which were not encompassed by
the preceding language of the "except" clause. And
we believe it evident that, under any interpretation
of the facts, the sales of the products of the Utah
Copper Division in this case were attributable to
permanent premises rented by Kennecott outside of
Utah.
Furthermore, the "attributable" clause emphasizes the primary statutory intent to attribute to
Utah only gross receipts fairly assignable to business there carried on and establishes the perspective for construing the other provisions of Paragraph 6(e). It thus becomes apparent that the real
and substantive question under the statute is, in
each case, whether the sales in question resulted
from sales activity within or otherwise related to
Utah or whether, on the contrary, they are in fact
attributable to sales activity permanently carried on
outside of this State. It is entirely inconsistent with
the purpose of the statute to attribute to Utah gross
receipts from sales which had no relation to any
sales activity conducted in that state. We believe
that on no reasonable basis can the gross receipts
provision of the statute be deemed to intend such
a result.
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2.

The sales were negotiated or effected in behalf of Kennecott by agents or agencies
chiefly situated at, connected with or sent
out from premises for the transaction of business rented by Kennecott outside of Utah.

The decision of the Commission9 moreover, can
not be sustained on any proper interpretation of the
initial provisions of the "except" clause of the gross
receipts factor, even if the last clause be disregarded.
The Commission held that sales of copper and
molybdenite sold without the State, through the
Sales Corporation, do not fall within the statutory
exception language and so are to be attributed to
Utah. This is because, in the view of the Commission, such sales were not made in behalf of Kennecott by "agents or agencies" of Kennecott within
the meaning of the statute and, even if so made, such
"agents or agencies" were not "chiefly. situated at,
connected with or sent out from premises . . , oAvned
or rented" by Kennecott.
The sales were made in behalf of Kennecott by agents or agencies of Kennecott.
There can be no real contention that the Sales
Corporation was not an "agent or agency" of Kennecott, The Eestatement of the Law, Agency lists
the following as the three essential characteristics
of an agency relationship:
§12.

Agent as Holder of a Power/ '~v39

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

An agent or apparent agent holds a power to
alter the legal relations between the principal and
third persons and between the principal and himself.
§13. Agent as a Fiduciary.
An agent is a fiduciary with respect to matters within the scope of his agency.
§14. Control by Principal.
A principal has the right to control the conduct of the agent with respect to matters entrusted to him.
Unquestionably these characteristics are found
in the arrangements between Kennecott and the
Sales Corporation. Under its agreement with Kennecott, the Sales Corporation had power to effect a
transfer of title in minerals from Kennecott to
third parties—to divest its principal of its interest
in its goods. The Sales Corporation had the power
to bind Kennecott by contracts and create liability
to third persons thereunder. It had the power to
acquire commissions by effecting sales.
The fiduciary nature of the relationship includes the duty to account for profits arising out
of the employment, the duty not to act adversely to
the principal's interest, and the duty not to compete
with the principal on the agent's own account or for
another in agency matters. All these duties were
explicit or implicit in the relationship between Ken40
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Trans.

necott and the Sales Corporation. It was explicitly
171,187, required to collect and remit to Kennecott net pro650,651, ceeds (after expenses and commissions) and to
653, 662 account therefor. It was required to sell at the highest price obtainable.

616

168

The Sales Corporation was subject to the direction, supervision and control of the officials of
Kennecott and was under standing orders to get
instructions in the event of unusual conditions.
Finally, the parties clearly contemplated an
agency relationship. The Sales Corporation was
designated as Kennecott's agent and it was agreed
that all sales should be made by the Sales Corporation "solely as sales agent" for Kennecott.
It is clear from the foregoing that the Sales
Corporation was an "agent" of Kennecott within
any recognized or normal definition of that term.
The fact is that the Commission itself recognized
that, in making sales for Kennecott, the Sales Corporation acted as Kennecott's agent. The position of
the Commission, however, is that such corporation
was a special type of agent which it characterized as
a "commission merchant" or "factor" and by reason
of this fact cannot be regarded as an "agent" or
"agency" within the meaning of the apportionment
statute. This position is asserted by the Commission despite the fact that the words "agents" and
41
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"agencies" are used without qualification in the
statute and there nowhere appears therein any
intent to exclude any particular types of agents.
That "commission merchants" and "factors" are
"agents" is perfectly clear in the law. 22 Am. Jur.,
Factors § § 1, 2. A factor is both an agent and a
bailee since one of the distinguishing characteristics
of this type of agency relationship is that the factor
is entrusted with the possession of the property.
22 Am. Jur., Factors §§ 2, 3. The factor, like any
other agent, has the powder to alter the legal relations between the principal and third persons and
between the principal and himself, is in a fiduciary
relationship to his principal, and must obey instructions from his principal. 22 Am. Jur., Factors §§
"3, 14, 20, 22, 50. The Restatement of the Law,
Agency summarizes the meaning of the word as
follows (§ 1(d)):
" 'Agent' is a word used to describe a person
authorized by another to act on his account and
under his control. Included within its meaining
are both those who, whether or not servants as
described in § 2, act in business dealings and those
who, being servants, perform manual labor. An
agent may be one who, to distinguish him from a
servant in determining the liability of the principal, is called an independent contractor. Thus, the
attorney at law, the broker, the factor, the auctioneer, and other similar persons employed either
for a single transaction or for a series of transactions are agents, although, as to their physical
activities, they are independent contractors."
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Finally, the use in the apportionment section
of the Utah statute of the word "agencies" in addition to the word "agent" clearly evidences a statutory intent to broaden the coverage rather than to
restrict it to only certain types of agents. "Agency"
is defined in Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1951) as an "instrumentality" and as an
"office or function of an agent, or factor." The word
is not limited to an individual, but clearly includes
a corporation or other organization or entity acting
in such capacity. In no place in the statute is the
intention evidenced that the language be confined to
the relationship of an employee or servant.
Moreover, even if such a narrow interpretation
of the statute were warranted, the decision was
incorrect on the facts. The relationship between
Kennecott and the Sales Corporation, contrary to
the finding of the Commission, was not one which
would justify a holding that there existed such independence from control of or lack of control by Kennecott as to support a finding that it was a "factor
or commission merchant" as those terms are customarily used. The Sales Corporation never obtained
possession of the products sold, possession remaining either in Kennecott or A. S. & K. on Kennecott's
behalf. It sold as "agent" for Kennecott's account,
not as principal. Kennecott constantly supervised
the activities of the Sales Corporation and there was
a standing instruction that if anything unusual
should occur the Kennecott officials were to be con43
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\V.suI{e3"beifpfe any action was taken with regard to
616
sales matters. The Sales Corporation did not sell
.
for any producer other than Kennecott or its subsidiaries and did not hold itself out generally to
other persons or companies as engaging in such
business activities. The Sales Corporation did not
650
guarantee the credit of customers.
In considering this question it should also not
be overlooked that the Sales Corporation is a wholly
owned subsidiary of Kennecott, organized by Kennecott solely for the purpose of selling Kennecott's
own products, that its employees were hired by
Kennecott and assigned to duties (either full or
-•'••TSifc" ; part-time) with the Sales Corporation, and that the
••52(2), majority of the directors and officers of the Sales
1
616
Corporation were officers or employees of Kenne" cott. For the purpose of the Utah. Franchise Tax as
applied to a unitary business such as this, the mere
fact that the Sales Corporation exists as a separate
legal entity is not significant, rather its activities
as they affect the Utah Copper Division should be
taken into account to the same extent as though it
were simply a division of Kennecott. For that purpose, the separate corporate entity of the Sales
Corporation may in effect properly be disregarded.
Cf. Centmont Corporationv. Marsch, 68 F . 2d 460;
•K Bishop v. U.-S., 16 F . 2d 410; Chicago M & St. P.
Ey. Co. v* Minneapolis, etc., Assn., 247 U. S. 490,
38 S. Ct. 553, 62 L, ad. 1229; In re Kentucky Wagon
Mfg. G o i r 3 F . Supp. 958, ( A f t 71 F . 2d 802, Cert.
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den. 293 U. S. 612); Darling Stores Corporation v.
Young Realty Co., 121 F . 2d 112 (CCA 8 ) ; Detroit
Motor Appliance Co. v. General Motors Corporation, 5 F. Supp. 27; Pacific Can Co. y. Hewes, 95 F.
2d 42 (CCA 9 ) ; Western Securities Co. v. Spiro, 62
Utah 623, 221 P. 856.
The evidence in the record clearly shows that
the operations of Kennecott and the Sales Corporation in the production and sale of copper and
molybdenite, from the removal of the ore from the
ground, through its milling, smelting and refining
processes and to and including the sale of the ultimate product to consumers, constitute a single unitary enterprise, the purpose of which is the realization of profit from the combined operations. In
such case, for franchise tax purposes to treat the
activities of the Sales Corporation as those of an
independent factor acting on its own behalf is to
disregard the essential economic facts of the case
as well as the actual relations between the parties.
This thought is well expressed in the statement of
the California Supreme Court in Edison California
Stores v. McColgan, 176 P. 2d 697 (aff. on rehearing,
183 P. 2d 16 (1947), where the Court stated, at p.
701:
"In the present case all of the elements of a
unitary business are present—unity of ownership,
unity of operation by centralized purchasing,
management, advertising and accounting, and
unity of use in the centralized executive force
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and general system of operation. The business of
the parent and all of its subsidiaries is owned and
managed under one centralized system, to the
same extent as in the Butler Brothers case and
other cases considered therein. Thus the business
is unitary regardless of the fact that in the Butler
Brothers case there was but one corporation
involved, owning as parts of the unitary system
seven different branches in as many states, and
that in the present case there is a parent corporation owning and controlling as units of one
system fifteen different branches organized as
corporations in as many states. No difference in
principle is discernible. If the crux of the matter
is to ascertain that portion of the business which
is done within this state, then the same considerations justify the use of the formula allocation
method in the one case as in the other."
In assigning the sales to Utah because it found
the Sales Corporation to be a "commission merchant
or factor," the Commission relied upon cases which
clearly do not support its position and, in fact,
actually support Kennecott's contention.
The first case cited by the Commission, Commonwealth v. Bayuk Cigars, Inc., 345 Pa. 348, 28 A.
2d 134 (1942), affd per curiam, 318 U. S. 746, 87
L. ed. 1123 (1943), involved sales negotiated outside
of Pennsylvania by salesmen whose selling activities
were performed in other jurisdictions, but the services of these men were supervised, directed and controlled by the home office in Pennsylvania, The
corporation had no offices owned or rented outside
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of Pennsylvania from which these men were
assigned or from which they could receive their
compensation. Under a Pennsylvania statute similar to that involved in the present case, the court
attributed the gross receipts from such sales to
Pennsylvania because the salesmen were working
out of the Pennsylvania office and not out of any
offices outside Pennsylvania. Kennecott has no
quarrel with this decision. Indeed, although the
facts are distinct from the present case, the obvious
rationale of the case supports Kenneeott's position.
The sales were to be assigned to the head office of
the corporation from which the selling activities
were directed and controlled and to which those
making the sales were responsible.
The Commission states in its opinion that it is
well settled that companies marketing their products outside of the state of production through the
medium of independent factors or commission merchants are not doing business for tax purposes outside the state of production so as to be entitled to an
apportionment of income within and without the
state on account of such out-of-state sales. In its
support, the Commission cites a comment by the
Supreme Court of California in Irvine Co. v. McColgan, 26 Cal. 2d 160, 157 P. 2d 847 (1945) to the
effect that the reason is that factors or commission
merchants are independent contractors engaged in
their own business rather than the business of their
principals. The decision of the Court in the Irvine
47
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Co. case was predicated upon the fact that the corporation had its only office and place of business in
California and marketed the greater portion of its
products out of California through what were held
to be commission merchants or factors. The Court
did not even reach the question of the allocation
formula because it decided that the entire business
of the taxpayer was done within California and, in
such event, the statute provided that the tax should
be measured by its entire net income.
Actually, all the comment relied upon by the
Commission says is that, if a factor markets a
corporation's products in a state, the corporation is
not thereby doing business in such state. It does
not say, and manifestly does not intend to say, that
there may not be other circumstances and conditions which would constitute doing business by the
corporation in that or in other states. Where the
corporation's only office and place of business is in
the state where its products are produced and the
factor has its authority from and responsibility to
that office the sales will be attributable to such
office in the state of production. But it follows from
this reasoning that if the corporation has an office
and place of business without the state of production, the sales made by a factor having its authority
from and responsibility to such office are to be
assigned to that out-of-state office. The question is
as to the office or place of business with which the
48
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factor, commission merchant or other agent or
agency is connected. It is that which determines
where the sales should be assigned.
The vital distinction between the Irvine Co. case
and the present case is that there the taxpayer's
entire activities were confined to the taxing (producing) state while, in this case, even though the
Sales Corporation be considered a commission merchant or factor, Kennecott admittedly was permanently and substantially engaged in business outside
of Utah, its principal offices being in New York
City, and conducted its own sales activities and
directed and supervised those of its agents from
such out-of-state office. All sales were connected
with and attributable to those offices and in no
sense to any office in Utah.
Where the corporation is engaged in business
outside of the producing state, allocation of income
is necessary; and, even assuming the commission
merchant's or factor's activities are to be ignored
(which we do not concede), the gross receipts from
sales are to be attributed to the state in which is
located the taxpayer's office with which such selling
activities are connected. In other words, the officers and employees of the taxpayer who entered into
the contract or arrangements with the commission
merchant or factor, and who exercise supervision
over such contract and the activities of such agent
(as in this case), actually negotiate or effect the
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sales in behalf of the taxpayer insofar as the sales
factor is concerned. It is the income from the
taxpayer's activities that is being allocated. Consequently, in such a case the taxpayer's activities,
sales-wise, should be given effect in the assignment
of sales if those of the agent are disregarded.
Similarly, in all of the other cases cited by the
Commission the sales activities of the taxpayer—
namely, the conduct and supervision of the sales
arrangements and the continuing relationship with
the commission merchant or factor there involved—
took place in the taxing state.
To illustrate, Commonwealth v. Minds Coal Mining Corporation, 360 Pa. 7, 60 A. 2d 14 (1948), involved a West Virginia corporation which owned and
operated a coal mine in West Virginia and maintained
its only executive and administrative office in Pennsylvania. The taxpayer had a contract with Bulah
Coal Mining Corporation whereby Bulah acted as
sales agent for the taxpayer. Bulah maintained its
own offices in New York and had its own salesmen.
It agreed to observe certain price limitations and
Federal regulations, make contracts with purchasers, invoice all shipments of coal direct to the
customer, collect for sales and assume the credit
risk. Orders for coal were forwarded by Bulah
to the West Virginia mines where the coal was
loaded to fill the orders. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that Bulah, as a result of a conSO
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tract, became the sales agent and authorized representative of the taxpayer for the sale of its coal;
and that the sales negotiated and effected by Bulah
were not by agents or agencies chiefly situate at,
connected with, or sent out from premises for the
transaction of business maintained by the taxpayer
outside the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. They
held, in consequence, that the gross receipts from
the sales of coal sold by Bulah were to be assigned
to Pennsylvania.
In this case, as in the others cited by the Commission, the taxpayer itself maintained no executive or sales office outside the state asserting the
tax, its principal office was within the taxing state,
and all of its own activities with respect to sales
occurred within the taxing state. Accordingly, these
cases offer no support for the Commission's assignment of the sales in this case to Utah. In fact, upon
analysis, they constitute direct support for Kennecott's position.
Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
the Minds case specifically held in its conclusions of
law that the sales involved were not effected in and
should not be assigned to West Virginia, the state
of production, the taxpayer having argued to that
effect. Thus we have in that case the situation where
the taxpayer mines its product in one state, maintains its executive and administrative headquarters
in the second state, and sells its product through a
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commission merchant or factor in a third state
which is not the state of production. Under the
Court's decision in that case the gross receipts from
sales were assigned not to the state of production
but to the state where the executive and administrative offices were maintained. We have in substance
the same situation in the present case: Kennecott
mines in one state, maintains its executive and
administrative offices in a second state, and (assuming arguendo that the Sales Corporation is a "factor") sells its products through a factor in the
second state, but not in the state of production. It
is strikingly clear that, under the Minds decision,
the gross receipts from sales should be assigned
to the state where the executive offices are maintained, and not to the state of production.
The Minds case also demonstrates the inequitable and incorrect nature of the Commission's decision in this proceeding. If the Commission's theory
in this case were followed, in every case in which a
"commission merchant" or "factor" is used for selling activity, every state in which the taxpayer did
any business related to the product sold might claim
that all of the gross receipts from sales are attributable to it. Thus, if the case stood for the proposition advanced by the Commission, in that same case
West Virginia could have assigned all of the sales
to itself, as the state of production, on the basis of
the same argument. And, if the taxpayer had also
fabricated the product in another state, that state
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could on similar reasoning assign Ml ;of the gross
receipts to itself. In other words, sales effected
through a factor could under such a theory be assigned in full to every state in which a (Corporation
is taxed because (according to the interpretation
advanced by the Commission) such sales will not
have been "negotiated or effected in behalf of the
corporation by agents or agencies chiefly situated at,
connected with, or sent out from premises for the
transaction of business owned or rented by the
corporation" in any jurisdiction.
It is clear that the Legislature of Utah did not
intend that its statute operate in any such inequitable and unreasonable manner. In the California
Packing case this Court stated (93 P. 2d at 468,
97 Utah 377): "There is also apparent a purpose
to avoid double taxation."
. Finally, the Commission in its decision seems
to have adopted just as unrealistic an interpretation
and application of the words "in behalf of the corporation" in the "except" clause in the gross receipts
factor, stating that sales were effected by the Sales
Corporation acting in its own behalf. And this, despite the statement in the same sentence that such
sales' were for the account of Kennecott. Of course,
every agent acts-in his own behalf in* the sense that
he performs the -activity:" or function and does so to
obtains compensation.: : But to state- that,: within the
meaning of the:""except", clause,, sales ofKennecott's
S3
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property by the Sales Corporation, as to which it
had to account to Kennecott for the proceeds less
expenses and commissions and was subject to the
direction and control of Kennecott, were made on
behalf of the Sales Corporation and not on behalf
of Kennecott would render the "except" clause
meaningless and inapplicable in any situation.
The sales were negotiated or effected by
agents or agencies "chiefly situated at,
connected with or sent out from premises" rented by Kennecott outside of
Utah.
The Commission has also erroneously interpreted and applied the "premises" provision of the
"except" clause of the gross receipts factor by holding, in effect, that the statutory provision was not
met since the sales were negotiated and effected
by employees of the Sales Corporation out of offices
owned or rented by it and not out of offices owned
or rented by Kennecott. In so doing the Commission
not only failed to give effect to the language of that
clause, but also acted upon an erroneous interpretation of the facts.
The "except" clause excludes from sales to be
attributed to Utah those made by agents or agencies
"chiefly situated at, connected with or sent out from
premises for the transaction of business owned or
rented by the corporation outside the state."
54
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As is perfectly clear, the language of the statute
is in the alternative—the agents can be either chiefly
situated at, or sent out from premises rented by
Kennecott, or they can be "connected with" such
premises. The vital consideration, and that which the
statute attempts to cover, is obviously whether in
fact the taxpayer regularly maintains offices and
conducts a portion of its business outside of the
State of Utah and whether the sales activities of the
taxpayer are related to such office rather than to
its operations in Utah.
It is undisputed that in this case all sales activities were performed outside of Utah and had no connection with any offices or places of business maintained by Kennecott or its agents within the State
of Utah.
As clearly appears from the testimony, it is
essential in the business in which Kennecott is engaged that its sales activities be centralized in and
68-9, conducted from offices on the eastern seaboard. This
L78 is equally true of its competitors. Ready access to
buyers, market data, markets and the like on the
part of its executive officers and sales representatives have required and continue to require their
location in New York City. The location of all sales
activities outside of Utah results from hard economic facts. No contention can be made, nor is one
made as we understand the position of the Com55
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mission, that the New York office of Kennecott was
not a bona fide and permanent office outside the
State of Utah and that all of Kennecott's sales
activities were not effected and directed from that
office.
145, 616,
The record is replete with evidence of the direct
618, 623, and continuing supervision of the sales activities of
629, the Sales Corporation by Kennecott's own officers
674-5 and employees. Constant contact was maintained
by Kennecott's officers with respect to the sales
activities of its agent and major sales policies were
determined by Kennecott's officers and transmitted
to the agent. The scheduling of production as related to sales, the supervision of accounting with
respect to proceeds of sales, and other important
matters required the constant consideration and
attention of Kennecott's officers and employees. All
of this supervision, direction and other sales activities on the part of Kennecott took place or emanated
from its New York office,—none occurred in Utah.
With these facts admitted, it is unrealistic to
attribute the entire gross receipts from the sales
so consummated to Utah on technical considerations
of occupancy of identical office space. Under no
reasonable interpretation of the statute can it be
said that the activities of Kennecott's agent—the
Sales Corporation—were not "connected with" a
56
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permanent place of business owned or rented by
Kennecott outside of the State of Utah or that the
sales were not "attributable" to such premises.

Ex.
41(2),
42(2)
575
et seq.

F. 63,
Ex.
52(2)
r. 576,
381-2,
1,613,
.6, 631
st seq.

Moreover, the offices occupied by the Sales
Corporation's employees were located on the same
floors of the same building in New York City as
those occupied by Kennecott's officers and employees, which premises were rented by Kennecott from
the building owner. Most of the officers and employees of the Sales Corporation were also officers
and employees of Kennecott. The office space made
available by Kennecott to the Sales Corporation
was only a part, and in general not a segregated
part, of the space rented by Kennecott from the
owner of the building. The Commission itself found
that the premises of Kennecott and the Sales Corporation were "joint offices and premises". Accounting, shipping billing, collecting, purchasing, legal,
telephone and cable and similar services were furnished to the Sales Corporation by Kennecott's
employees, the Sales Corporation being charged by
Kennecott for its appropriate portion of the cost of
such services. Admitting all this, the Commission
insists that the Sales Corporation was not "situated
at, connected with or sent out from" premises of
Kennecott merely because, among many other salary
and expense items originally paid by Kennecott and
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Ex.
.48(2)
582
et seq.,
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then allocated among the departments involved,
including the Sales Corporation, was an amount
with respect to "rent". Even this item admittedly
was not a fixed charge for any definite space but
an indirect allocated charge.
The foregoing we believe suffices to indicate
the nature of the Commission's action on this point
and we will not seek to extend this brief unduly to
discuss in greater detail the evidence on this point.
We do not believe that the incidence of the tax can
be deemed to be dependent on such a theoretical and
minor point as that advanced by the Commission.
As illustrative of the lack of substance or reasonable
basis for the Commission's decision on this point, it
is interesting to speculate as to what its decision
would have been had the building in which Kennecott
and the Sales Corporation maintained their joint
offices been owned by Kennecott rather than space
therein leased from an outside owner. In such case,
the space occupied by the employees of the Sales
Corporation would have been in premises "owned"
by Kennecott.
As the foregoing discussion of the Commission's
contentions with respect to the "agency" and "premises" sections of the gross receipt factor demonstrates, the Commission does not give effect to the
actual wording of the statute but rather applies it
as if it read as follows (additions in italics and
omissions in brackets):
58

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"(1st) Sales, except those negotiated or
effected in behalf of the corporation in its name
by agents or agencies other than factors or commission agents chiefly situated at, [connected
with] or sent out from premises for the transaction of business owned or rented by the corporation outside this state and for the use or occupancy of which the selling agent or agency pays
to the corporation no rent or rental charge . . . ."
3.

Until 1951 the Commission had concurred in
assigning to business carried on outside Utah
the gross receipts from sales of the Utah
Copper Division's mineral products. This
long-standing administrative construction and
application of the apportionment statute
should be controlling.

Even if there had initially been a question as to
the interpretation of the gross receipts factor of
the apportionment statute, the Commission's own
long-standing interpretation and application thereof
so as to exclude gross receipts from sales of the
Utah Copper Division's products should now be
followed.
From the passage of the Franchise Tax Act in
1931 until 1951, the Commission, in applying
the statutory apportionment formula, consistently
assigned to business carried on outside of Utah
100% of the gross receipts from sales of mineral
-7 products of the Utah Copper Division.
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The nature and purpose of the Sales Corpora"'''l".^"'ti6^'si^c.e..ij£s organization in 1933 as the sales agent
~: of'Kennecott had been well known by the Commission. In full knowledge of the facts, for 1941 and
prior years the Commission had consistently applied
. ; the statutory formula and assigned all sales of
- ; inineral-products outside the State. For 1942 and
• , subsequent years, .Kennecott filed its returns on
the basis here contended for by Kennecott. When
the Commission on March 10, 1945 applied an algebraic formula as to the computation of the depletion
deduction with respect to 1942, it again conceded
the propriety of Kenneeott's assigning 100% of
sales to business carried on outside of Utah. When
the depletion issue for that year came to this Court,
Kennecott Copper Corporation v. State Tax Commission, supra, the Commission likewise conceded
the propriety of such assignment of sales by Kennecott and this Court concurred accordingly.
I t was not until 1951 that the Commission in any
way departed or indicated any intent to depart from
its former practice and it was not until 1952, during
the course of the hearings in this case, that the Commission applied the allocation formula so as to
1
; assign to Utah gross receipts from sales of mineral
;•.> products.
Even if there were doubt as to the proper interp r e t a t i o n and application of the statute (and Kennecott submits tllat there is no reasonable doubt as
60
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to the correctness of its contentions), such a long
and consistent administrative construction of the
statutory provision by the public agency charged
with its administration should control.
C. The apportionment statute, as construed and
applied by the State Tax Commission, would unconstitutionally tax income from activities beyond
the jurisdiction of Utah and would unduly burden
interstate commerce.
Since, under what we regard as the proper construction of the statute, the result in this case is to
eliminate from the numerator of the gross receipts
factor of the apportionment statute, the gross receipts from sales made outside of Utah, there is no
necessity for this Court to pass upon the constitutional questions involved under either the Federal
or the Utah Constitution.

Under established principles of judicial construction, the statute should be construed so as to
avoid serious doubts as to its constitutionality. If
the statute were to be applied in the manner determined by the Commission, it would result in taxing
income not attributable to business activities carried
on within the jurisdiction of Utah and would thus
deprive Kennecott of due process of law within the
meaning of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and
Section 7 of Article I of the Constitution of Utah
61
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and would likewise unduly burden interstate commerce in violation of Section 8 of Article I of the
Federal Constitution.
It has long been settled by the Supreme Court
of the United States that a state cannot tax income
from activities done or income earned without its
jurisdiction and that an apportionment formula,
however valid on its face, is invalid if, as applied to
the facts, it results in the allocation of an unreasonable or arbitrary amount of income to the taxing
jurisdiction.
Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain,
254 IT. S. 113, 65 L. ed. 165, (1920);
Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax
Commission, 266 U. S. 271, 69 L. ed. 283,
(1924);
Hans Bees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283
U. S. 123, 51 S. Ct. 385, 75 L. ed. 879, (1931);
Butler Brothers v. McColgan, 315 U. S. 501,
62 S. Ct. 701, 86 L. ed. 991, (1942).
In the Hans Rees' case, discussed above, the
Supreme Court held invalid a North Carolina tax
based upon net income because the apportionment
formula as applied to the particular facts operated
to tax profits not attributable to transactions within
its jurisdiction. Net income was assigned to North
Carolina in the ratio that the value of real and per62
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sonal property in that state bore to the value of all
such property. The taxpayer, a New York corporation, was engaged in the business of tanning,
manufacturing and selling belting and other heavy
leathers. Its manufacturing plant was located in
North Carolina and it conducted its business upon
both wholesale and retail levels. Its wholesale business consisted of selling hides to shoe manufacturers
in carload lots and the retail business consisted of
cutting the hides into innumerable pieces, finishing
it in various ways, and selling it in less than carload lots. A warehouse was located in New York
from which shipments were made from stock on hand
to various customers. When the merchandise required by a customer was not on hand in the New
York warehouse, it was shipped from North Carolina either to the New York warehouse or direct to
the customer. The sales office was located in New
York and the salesmen reported to that office, sales
being made throughout the United States, including
North Carolina, and abroad. Certain finishing work
was done in New York. Between 40% and 50% of
the output of the North Carolina plant was shipped
to New York, the remainder being shipped directly
to the customers on orders from New York.
The income allocated to North Carolina pursuant to its statutory method for the years involved
was in excess of 83%, 84%, 66% and 85%, respectively. The Supreme Court of North Carolina had
upheld the statute as being not invalid on its face.
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But the Supreme Court of the United States held
the statute as applied invalid, stating (283 U. S. at
pp. 134-136):
"When, as in this case, there are different
taxing jurisdictions, each competent to lay a tax
with respect to what lies within, and is done within, its own borders, and the question is necessarily
one of apportionment, evidence may always be
received which tends to show that a State has
applied a method, which, albeit fair on its face,
operated so as to reach profits which are in no
just sense attributable to transactions within its.
jurisdiction.
*

#

*

" F o r the present purpose, in determining the
validity of the statutory method as applied to the
appellant, it is not necessary to review the evidence in detail, or to determine as a matter of
fact the precise p a r t of the income which should
be regarded as attributable to the business conducted in North Carolina. It is sufficient to say
that, in any aspect of the evidence, and upon the
assumption made by the state court with respect
to the facts shown, the statutory method, as
applied to the appellant's business for the years
in question operated unreasonably and arbitrarily,
in attributing to North Carolina a percentage of
income out of all appropriate proportion to the
business transacted by the appellant in that State.
In this view, the taxes as laid were beyond the
State's authority."
The Hans Rees' case has been discussed in detail
because it is strikingly analogous to the present
case, each being a situation where a review of the
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facts and the results of the application of the apportionment statute by the tax authorities immediately
disclose an unreasonable and arbitrary allocation of
net income to the taxing jurisdiction. As pointed out
previously, the Hans Bees' case involved only a
single factor apportionment formula. However, in
the instant case, the interpretation accorded the
gross receipts factor by the Commission, in effect,
substantially reads it out of the statute and thus
attributes to Utah income in fact earned in other
states.
The following, among other cases, evidence the
restrictions upon state taxation of income or property without its borders and upon burdening interstate commerce.
Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts,
268 U. S. 203, 69 L. ed. 916 (1925);
J. D. Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen, 304
U. S. 307, 82 L. ed. 1365 (1938);
Gwinn, White & Prince v. Henneford, 305 U. S.
434, 83 L.ed. 272 (1939);
McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U. S. 327, 88 L.
ed. 1304 (1944);
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 91 L. ed. 265
(1946);
Joseph v. Carter and Weekes Stevedoring Co.,
330 U. S. 422, 91 L. ed. 993 (1946);
Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. State Tax
Commission, 334 II. S. 653, 92 L. ed. 1633
(1948).
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Moreover, it is clear that the invalidity of the
Utah tax, if applied as has been done by the Commission so as to tax Kennecott's activities beyond
its jurisdiction, is not dependent upon taxation in
fact in any other state or the basis or amount thereof. Such factors are entirely irrelevant. As stated
in Freeman v. Hewit, supra, (pp. 256-57):
"It is suggested, however, that the validity
of a gross sales tax should depend on whether
another State has also sought to impose its burden on the transactions. If another State has
taxed the same interstate transaction, the burdensome consequences to interstate trade are undeniable. But that, for the time being, only one State
has taxed is irrelevant to the kind of freedom of
trade which the Commerce Clause generated. The
immunities implicit in the Commerce Clause and
the potential taxing power of a State can hardly
be made to depend, in the world of practical affairs, on the shifting incidence of the varying tax
laws of the various States at a particular
moment."
And in Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Tax Commission, supra, the Supreme Court said (p. 663):
«* # # £] v e n if neither Pennsylvania nor New
Jersey sought to tax their proportionate share
of the revenue from this transportation, such
abstention would not justify the tax by New York
of the entire revenue."
The Supreme Court of the United States has
but recently reaffirmed that state taxation is not
unrestricted. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Con66
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ner, 340 U. S. 602, 71 S. Ct. 508, 95 L. ed. 573 (1951).
Consequently, if the obvious intent of the UtaJi
apportionment statute and the plain meaning of its
specific provisions are ignored and contravened, as
in the decision of the Commission attributing to
Utah sales having no relation thereto, constitutional
invalidity will result.
II.
Point
In computing percentage depletion with respect to
the Utah Copper Division, the statutory term "net
income from the property" means the gross receipts
from the sale of products less only costs and expenses.
The second basic issue in this case concerns the
amount of the deduction from gross income to be
made for depletion in computing the net income of
the Utah Copper Division for franchise tax purposes.
Under the Utah Franchise Tax statute, the net
income, to be apportioned within and without Utah
in accordance with the apportionment formula discussed in Point I of this Brief, is to be determined
by deducting from its gross income the several
deductions specified in Section 80-13-8 (Sec. 59-13-7
Utah Code 1953) of the statute. The gross income
from which such deductions are to be made is the
total gross income resulting from operations both
within and without the State; similarly, the deduc67
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tions specified are those applicable to the business
done both within and without the State. Such deductions, to be made before apportionment of net
income, include "in the case of mines . . . a reasonable allowance for depletion." The section then
provides:
"Percentage allowance for depletion.
(b) The allowance for depletion shall be
thirty-three and one-third percent of the net income from the property during the taxable year,
computed without allowance for depletion or on
the basis provided in Sub-section (9) (a) as the
taxpayer may elect."
Since Kennecott elected to use the percentage
method of computing the allowance for depletion,
the only question here involved is as to the proper
construction and application, under the facts of this
case, of the foregoing provision for percentage
depletion, and in particular the words "net income
from the property."

146

F. 12j
131

As more fully set forth above in this Brief (pp.
4 to 14), the operations of Kennecott's Utah Copper Division within and without the State of Utah
constitute a continuous, indivisible and integrated
operation, the single purpose of which is the production and sale at a profit of mineral products.
During the years here in question, ore extraction
and concentration were effected-by-Kennecott itself
68
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at its mines and Arthur and Magna mills, located
14,179 in Utah. At this point, the molybdenite concentrates
and certain precipitates, aggregating but a small
percentage of the total, were sold to customers outside of the State.
In the case of all other metals, the remaining
processes necessary to produce the marketable refined metals, and all transportation related to such
. 43
processes, were performed for Kennecott by others.
Thus, practically all such concentrates coming from
267-8 Kennecott's mills were smelted for Kennecott by
A. S. & R., at its Garfield smelter in Utah, and
practically all the blister copper resulting from the
smelting was transported by common carriers to
the refineries of A. S. & R. located in Maryland and
216
New Jersey, where it was electrolytically refined and
the copper, gold, silver, platinum and palladium, for
Ex.
the first time in marketable form, were obtained.
ii(2), Such smelting and refining were i)erformed for
T-. 20 Kennecott by A. S. & R., an independent company,
), 226, for a negotiated fee on what may be termed a "cost
100 plus" basis; that is, under a contract which provided
for the reimbursement by Kennecott to A. S. & R.
of specified costs incurred by it in processing Kennecott's products plus fixed amounts per ton to
cover A. S. & R.'s overhead^ profit, taxes and other
items not compensated for through the direct reimbursement of costs::.Thei'rarisp6rtati6ri of the blister
• • copper f rom: the \ Gar field -Smelter- of AV-S; & R. to
;:. •• the;.refineries: in'the East was perfor-med* for Ken*
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necott by cofrimon carriers, entirely independent of
Kennecott, at regular published tariff rates. Until
sale after completion of the refining, all such prod171, 609 nets remained the property of Kennecott.
With the minor exception mentioned above, it
is admitted by both parties, and the Commission so
found, that none of the production of Kennecott's
mines or mills resulted in a commercially marketable
409 product, and that there was no representative market or field price, in Utah or elsewhere, for the
P. 70 minerals in the crude form in which they came from
Kennecott's mills. The copper, gold, silver, platinum
and palladium were not in marketable form until
43-4, after they had been smelted and electrolytically
268,308 refined at refineries located outside of Utah. In
the case of these products, it was only at this final
point in the production process that any market for
53
such metals existed.
Kennecott contends that the term "net income
from the property" in the percentage depletion provision means the gross receipis from the sale of the
products of the Utah Copper Division, less all related expenses of mining, concentrating, smelting,
refining, transportation and sale and also less
Federal income taxes.
The Commission takes the position that "net
income from the property" means the gross receipts
from the sale of such products, less such expenses
70
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and income taxes, and also less a substantial portion
of such net income which it deems to be attributable
to what it terms the "post-mining" processes,
namely, smelting, refining, transportation and sale.
Under the Commission's decision, the amount of net
income attributable respectively to the mining and
post-mining processes as by it defined is deemed to
be the portion thereof which the costs and expenses
of each such class of processes bear to the total of
282-3 such costs and expenses (including depletion). This
position is taken by the Commission although it
admits that processes beyond ore extraction and
milling are required in order to obtain a marketable
product, and that such additional processes were
not conducted by Kennecott itself but were perF. 14 formed for it by independent parties.
Under Kennecott's construction of the statute,
the statutory allowance for depletion is obtained
very simply by applying the factor of 33%% to the
net income obtained by deducting from gross receipts all expenses (including income taxes) other
than the depletion allowance itself.

294

The Commission's position, however, requires
the use of an algebraic formula, involving quadratics. This is because (a) the allocation of net
income ratably to costs (including depletion) required to determine the amount of depletion cannot
be determined until the depletion deduction itself
is determined, and (b) the amount of depletion, in
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turn, depends on the allocation of net income. The
use of this formula by the Commission resulted, for
the period involved, in a depletion deduction which
was not 33%% of total net income from mineral
production before depletion (as provided by the
statute), but was 33y3% of approximately 78% of
such total net income. This 78% of total net income
was the amount of such total net income which the
application of the formula attributed to mining and
concentrating processes.
In support of its contention, Kennecott submits
that (a) the language of the statute is clear and
that the Commission's interpretation, requiring the
use of an algebraic formula, is not only illogical and
insupportable but cannot reasonably be deemed to
have been intended by the Utah Legislature, (b) that
the legislative history of the Utah percentage depletion provision, as set forth in the testimony, is so
specific and clear as to admit of no dispute as to its
proper interpretation in the manner asserted by
Kennecott, and (c) that the Commission's present
construction of the statute is contrary to the administrative interpretation accorded it for many years
following its enactment and also is contrary to the
construction given by the Commission to other provisions of the tax laws of Utah.
A. The language of the statutory depletion provision
is clear and supports Kennecott's contention. The
Commission's use of an algebraic formula is unnecessary, contrary to the language of the statute
and was not intended by the Legislature.
72
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66-8
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The language of the depletion provision supports Kennecott's position completely. The plain
and natural meaning of the words is that "net in*
corne from the property" means the actual receipts
from sales of the products less all related costs,
expenses and taxes. This is the ordinary and normal
way of determining "net income", and permits of
a ready and simple calculation of the depletion
deduction. Nowhere does the statute even imply
that this ordinary method of determining net income
is to be departed from nor does it imply that, in a
unitary operation such as Kennecott's, the term "net
income" means only that portion of the ordinary net
income deemed attributable to a part of the single
business which has produced the income. As pointed
out by the Court in New Park Mining Company v.
State Tax Commission, 113 Utah 410, 196 P. 2d 485,
the addition of the words "from the property" do
not envisage some different method of computing
net income than that ordinarily employed; on the
contrary, they are intended only to relate the net
income in question to that derived from the sale of
the wasting asset, as distinct from income from
other sources. There this Court said:
"We note, also, the contention of plaintiffs
that the phrase 'net income from the property
during the taxable year' means something different from 'net income.' The theory upon which
wasting assets corporations, such as mining companies, are allowed a deduction for depletion, is
that the corporation franchise tax, is a tax on
income or upon the increment produced by capi73
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: tal, and not upon the capital itself. Hence, wasting assets corporations are allowed a deduction
for depletion on the theory that the taxpayer thus
recoups its capital investment. But a wasting
assets corporation may have income other than
that derived from the sale of its capital. On such
other income it is not entitled to a deduction for
depletion. Hence in Section 80-13-8(9) (b) which
provides for deduction for depletion, the words
'net income' were qualified with the words 'from
the property' so that wasting assets corporations
would not be entitled to make a deduction for
depletion from all income, from whatever source
derived. The words are not ambiguous and do not
create a separate concept or a separate kind of
net income for tax purposes. They merely serve
to indicate that deductions for depletion can be
made only from that portion of the taxpayer's
net income which is derived from sales of its
capital assets." (Italics supplied.)
The Commission, however, would construe the
statute so as to require, in lieu of the simple and
ordinary computation seemingly prescribed, an unrealistic allocation of net income to what are but
component parts of a continuous and unified process
all of which are necessary to the production of
marketable products. As a result, it would require
the use of an elaborate algebraic formula in order
to determine the amount of the depletion allowance
provided by the statute.
74
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Where a statute permits of a ready and simple
method of calculation in accordance with ordinary
accounting methods, it is obviously unreasonable to
attribute to the Legislature which enacted it an intent
to require an algebraic formula involving quadratics
for the purpose of determining the deduction/
* The complicated nature of the formula is evident
from the mere statement thereof made by Mr. C.
W. Allison of the Commission's auditing division,
in his letter to Kennecott :
"Herewith is the formula which was used
in arriving at the $6,455,813.78 allowable depletion shown in Schedule No. 8 of our report
dated March 10, 1945, in connection with your
1942 Utah corporation franchise tax return.
D2 + D(2TC + MC—TNI) — TNI • MC = 0
3
3
D = allowable percentage depletion.
TC = total costs of mining, milling, concentrating, smelting, refining, transporting, and selling the ore and ore
products, before depletion.
($62,619,791.58 per Schedule No. 8)
MC = mining costs, including milling and
concentrating costs, transportation
of ore to mill, etc. before depletion.
($40,991,515.78 per Schedule No. 8)
TNI = total net income derived from ore
products, before depletion, but after
federal taxes
($25,253,046.43 per Schedule No. 8)
By making the appropriate substitutions and
solving for 'D' the $6,455,813.78 figure is arrived at. If any further information is desired,
we shall be glad to furnish it."
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In connection with a similar attempt to attribute to Congress the requirement of an analogous
(although not nearly so complicated) algebraic computation, in Edwards v. Slocum, 287 F. 651 (2d Cir.
1923) the Court said (pp. 653-55):

u

. . . the taxpayer perceives that the 'net
: estate,' which is practically synonymous with
taxable estate, is to receive augmentation by an
unknown amount, which renders its own figure
unknown; but this baffles arithmetic, so he has
recourse to an algebraic formula, which has
played an unduly important part in the arguments at bar.

"We have treated this formula in a footnote;
it is only legally important in that it has produced
the argument that any method of taxation, or of
working out taxes, that requires so much algebra,
'must be wrong.' We need not go so far, but do
hold that the presumption is that Congress intended a simpler method — one that a plain man
could understand. Algebraic formulae are not
lightly to be imputed to legislators.
*

#

«

*

" '.. . . . History, so far as we can discover,
shows no other instance of attempting to measure
a tax pro tanto by itself."
76
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In this connection Mr. Henry B. Fernald* in
his testimony in this case aptly pointed out this
error in the position of the Commission, as follows :
u

The statute of the State of Utah seems to
me not to contemplate nor warrant the use of any
such algebraic formula. I know of no taxing
statute of any state which contemplates any such
algebraic formula. It seems to violate all accepted
standards of simplicity and comprehensibility in
a taxing statute or in good tax practice."
Furthermore, the Commission's position violates the specific statutory requirement that the
allowance for depletion is to be 33%% of the net
income from the property "computed without allowance for depletion." In other words, the statute
* Mr. Fernald is a nationally recognized authority
in the fields of accounting and taxation, particularly with respect to mining. He has been for many
years a member of the Tax Committee of the
United States Chamber of Commerce and has
been a member of and is now Vice-Chairman of
the Tax Committee of the International Chamber
of Commerce. For many years he has been a member of and the Chairman of the Tax Committee of
the American Mining Congress. Since 1921 he has
frequently appeared before legislative and administrative bodies in connection with tax legislation
and has assisted in the drafting of proposed
Federal tax legislation and regulations applicable
to mining and other natural resource businesses.
243
He has also had a broad experience for over 30
t seq.,
years in state and municipal tax matters in both
470
an advisory and administrative capacity.
77
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

specifically excludes depletion as a factor in computing the net income upon which depletion is based.
As previously stated, far from excluding such depletion as such a factor, the Commission's method of
computation by use of an algebraic formula necessarily involves the use of the depletion deduction
itself in determining the net income with respect to
which depletion is computed.
Moreover, the Commission has utilized illogical
and insupportable reasoning in its theory that the
net income of the Utah Copper Division can be
attributed to each of the processes and activities
carried on by the Utah Copper Division in direct
proportion to the costs and expenses of each such
process or activity. The simple answer to this part
of the Commission's theory is that an allocation of
income ratably to costs just does not make good
287-8 sense. As Mr. Fernald testified:
"The basic error in the method is its assumption that income will arise ratably to costs. This
would be true only in the case of 'cost-plus' contracts where the amount to be received as income
will be determined as a percentage of costs. It
is not true when income receipts are determined
by sales at competitive or fixed prices without
regard to the costs involved in any particular
case. In such case, the net income is what remains
of the receipts after deduction of the costs, and
the amount of the costs determines how much of
the receipts will not constitute income. The general principle in such a case is that the higher the
costs the less the net income, and the lower the
costs the greater the net income.
78
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"The assumption of the Commission's method
is directly contrary to this principle in that the
method is based on an assumption that the greater
the costs the greater the share of income allocable thereto, and the less the costs the less the
share of income.
"The mere statement of this fundamental
error in the basis of this method should be sufficient to show it is not a fair and reasonable
method to be applied. The examples given merely
serve to illustrate the unreasonable results such
as come from the use of the essentially defective
method."
236-9

Mr. Seymour Wells* likewise testified:
"In my opinion, this (the Commission's)
method for computing depletion is wrong for
several reasons.
"The principal reason is that the formula is
not based on any sound accounting principle. It
is entirely a fiction to suppose that the total

* Mr. Seymour Wells is a former president of the
Utah Association of Certified Public Accountants
with long experience in accounting and mining
matters. From 1917 to 1924 he was a Federal
internal revenue agent. In 1931 he was employed
by the State of Utah to assist in drafting the corporation franchise tax law. He also assisted in
planning the accounting system and procedure
for the newly organized State Tax Commission,
231
in drafting forms for the returns, and the instrucet seq,
tions with respect thereto.
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profits of the single business are divisible among
the various stages of production according to
their relative costs. The results obtained have no
real meaning. Moreover, there is no reason for
ascribing any profit at all to freight or to the
other purchased services of smelting and refining.
In my opinion, the entire profit is net income
from the property as that term is generally understood. * * *
"Finally, I believe the-method of apportionment of profits to various stages of production
on the basis of relative costs is wrong because it
gives a relatively greater profit to a high cost
and less to a low cost. Under this method, if
freight rates should go up and mine costs down,
more profit would be assigned to freight and less
to mining. This is unreasonable. * * *
"As the product goes along the stages of production, it accumulates costs, and the cost value
increases, and finally it gets to the stage where
it is sold, and there are many factors entering into
what they get for it. It is based on supply and
demand, and not cost of production solely; and
there is no way of telling what the profit will be
until that sale is arrived at.
"Now this formula attempts, or according to
the formula, it accumulates not only the costs but
a proportion of the profit for the whole year. To
do that it would have to know what the profit is,
and second, what proportion each dollar of expenditure should have of the total. Of course, there
is no such determination possible as that. It is
nothing real. It is simply a fictitious arithmetical
calculation without any meaning."
80
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It should be noted that the foregoing testimony
of Mr. Fernald and Mr. Wells is in no way contested by any testimony presented on behalf of the
Commission. The Commission at no point in these
hearings presented any testimony in support of the
formula used by it in its method of allocating profits
ratably to costs or of its construction of the statute.
B.

The Legislative history of the percentage depletion provision of the Utah Statute clearly demonstrates that the Legislature intended the computation to be made as Kennecott asserts.

As shown above, the language of the percentage
depletion provision provides no support for the
devious and complicated calculation of depletion
attempted by the Commission in this case; nor is it
to be presumed that the Legislature in enacting the
provision intended that it be applied in such a
fashion.
That the Legislature had no such intent—that,
on the contrary, it intended the words to mean
exactly what Kennecott contends they do mean—is
evident from an examination of the legislative history of the provision and the construction given it
by the Commission itself for many years following
its enactment.
F o r an understanding of the legislative background of the depletion provision, which was first
adopted by the Utah Legislature in 1931, a brief
81
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review of the treatment accorded depletion for
mines under the Federal income tax laws is apposite.
The purpose of a deduction for depletion in
computing any tax levied on income is, of course, to
avoid the taxing as income of that part of the gross
57
return of a "wasting-assets" enterprise which repreet seq. sents the exhaustion of capital.
The income tax laws of the Federal Govern472 ment have for many years included provisions for
et seq. an allowance for depletion to taxpayers engaged in
a wasting-assets business. In the earlier years of
the Federal income tax, the basis of the depletion
allowance for mines was the cost of the property or
its fair market value as of March 1, 1913 or its discovery date. The determination of such fair market
value generally necessitated estimating the future
60
output of the mine, the period of production, the
et seq., prices for the product which could be obtained over
66
such future period, the cost of production, the plant
et seq. and equipment required, and other factors requiring
an estimate for the future. When the results had
been so estimated, it was necessary to discount them
back to obtain a present value. That value was then
divided by the estimated mineral units to be produced in order to determine the depletion per unit
allowable as a tax deduction.
82
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There was much complaint as to these difficul62, 65 ties, of the uncertainty inherent in their application,
and of the fact that they seemed to work unfair discrimination between various taxpayers. Provision
had been made in the Federal statute for "percentage depletion" for oil and gas in 1926. The question then arose of providing for percentage depletion for mines. This matter was given extended
study by the Joint Committee of Internal Revenue
of the United States Congress, which requested the
preparation of a report with respect thereto by its
staff. As a result, the so-called Parker Report,
which included the Shepherd Report as an appendix,
68, 73 was submitted to the Joint Committee in 1929. These
reports recommended the adoption of percentage
depletion for metal mines, the Parker report recommending that it be based upon net income (one alternative suggested being 33%% of net income) and
70, 84-6, the Shepherd Report that it be 15% of gross income
299 with a limitation of 50% of net income.

68

Percentage depletion represents an effort to get
away from the difficulties of estimating future
receipts and costs, inherent in the former "analytic
appraisal method," by utilizing actual receipts and
costs each year instead of such future estimates. It
was recognized that over a period of time a percentage of current net income (gross receipts, less costs)
would be substantially equivalent to the deduction
computed in the former manner if the future esti83
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•

68

mates there made had been correct. This purpose
is recognized in the Parker Report. As appears
therefrom, percentage depletion was not intended
generally to arrive at a substantially different allowance from that sought under the former method, but
rather to simplify the procedure by which the allowance was to be determined. Thus, the Parker Report
states:
"The methods of percentage depletion proposed for consideration are not such a departure
from the present system as would appear from a
preliminary inspection. The analytic method of
valuation now used in most important cases arrives at a value through the estimation of future
expected profits. Depletion based on a percentage
of the net income from the property merely uses
actual figures instead of estimated figures."
#

.

#

#

#

#

"It has already been pointed out that the most
important valuations for depletion purposes are
computed by the analytic appraisal method. This
method requires an estimate to be made of the
future profits of the mine. If it were possible to
determine these future profits correctly, they
would equal the net income from the property.
The question at once arises: What is the use of
estimating such profits if the actual profits can be
: used? In fact, it can be proven mathematically
that depletion by a percentage of net income and
. . depletion by the analytic appraisal method will
be the same if the expected profit is correctly
estimated in using the latter method." •
84
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As above indicated, when the Utah franchise
tax was passed in 1931 (Laws of 1931, Chapter 39),
the Federal income tax law had not yet provided for
percentage depletion for mines. It did, however, use
a percentage of-"net income . . . from the propert)^'
as a limitation on the discovery depletion of mines
otherwise allowable.

487

Under the practice of the Treasury in applying
this limitation, net income represented the actual
selling price of the products less all the costs of
production. The only exception to this practice was
one, not applicable to Kennecott's case, where a representative market or field price existed for the
product at a stage in its processing prior to that in
which it was actually sold.

At the time the Utah franchise tax statute was
under consideration, the Parker Report, and related
5, 81-2 Shepherd Report, were considered by the Utah Tax
Revision Commission. Both of these reports, in
recommending the adoption by Congress of percentage depletion for mines, assumed a determination of
78
gross income and net income, based on actual receipts less expenses, which was in accordance with
the construction given the then existing statute and
regulations by the Treasury, as outlined above.
Thus, the Parker Report points out, in the quotations given above, that the purpose of adopting percentage depletion is to avoid the necessity of making
85
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the estimates and assumptions necessary under the
formei- practice of determining the fair market value
of the property. The purpose was to simplify, and
not to complicate, the procedure. Nowhere in the
Parker Report is the suggestion made that the percentage depletion there recommended should be
based upon a determination of net income which
would differ from that then being followed by the
Treasury with respect to the limitation of the allowance for discovery depletion.
On this point the Shepherd Report expressly
stated:
"For the purpose of this subdivision 'the
gross income from the property' shall be the competitive market receipts, or its equivalent, received from the sale of the crude, partially beneficiated or refined gold, silver, or copper, the
product actually disposed of by the taxpayers to
govern the method of computation of receipts in
all cases, and in the case of all other metals, coal
and oil and gas, the competitive market receipts,
or its equivalent, received from the sale of the
crude products, or concentrates on an f. o. b. mine,
mill, or well basis."
"The 'net income of the taxpayer (computed
without allowance for depletion) from the property' shall be determined by deducting allowable
expenses except depletion from 'the gross income
from the property' as defined above."
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65, 81-2

82

.-•••'

The Parker Report, and accompanying Shepherd Report, were carefully considered by the Tax
Revision Commission in its consideration of the
proposed Utah franchise tax legislation enacted in
1931. Mr. G. C. Earl* testified as to the hearings
with respect to such legislation. Mr. Earl testified
as follows:
"I attended as a representative of the Copper
Company most of the hearings which were held
at the time this law was being considered, and in
addition some conferences which were held on the
side. The two important men who took part in
those conferences were Dr. Lutz, who had been
brought here by the Tax Commission, and Mr.
Graton. There were others, Mr. Brownrigg, who
had been employed under Mr. Vandegriff, who
had been employed by the producers. And there
were a great number of conferences held, discussions took place, as to the method of arriving at
depletion. That was the primary discussion that
took place at most of these conferences.
"The quotations were read from the Parker
Report and there was considerable discussion
among the representatives of various units as to
whether they should use 15 per cent of the gross

* Mr. Earl has been employed as a mining engineer
by Kennecott or its predecessor since 1909. Since
1938 he has been Chief Engineer of the Utah Copper Division. He has had close contact with
Federal and State tax questions and participated
actively in conferences and hearings relating to
J-43,82 the 1931 Utah franchise tax legislation.
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or 33^3 per cent of the net. It finally came out, of
course, when the law was passed with 33% per
cent of the net. Both of these plans had been
included and had been discussed in the Parker
Report."
In his testimony Mr. Earl read from a report
of the Tax Revision Commission which specifically
stated that net income should be determined under
the Utah law substantially as it was determined
under the Federal law, since that arrangement
would have the great advantage of being familiar
to all of the larger business concerns and would permit the taxpayer to comply with the provisions of
the state law by using the data on the basis of which
100,104 the Federal return was prepared. Mr. Earl testified:
" . . . as there was no difference between the
Federal and State statutes as to apparently what
constitutes gross income from the property, we
made a particular study as to what would be the
amount allowable under the 'net income from the
property' phrase.
"At that time the hearings had all been held,
the law had been passed, but the Federal percentage depletion basis had not been adopted (by
Congress). It was not adopted (by the Federal
Government) until 1932. It was understood by
everyone which we came in contact with that the
net income from the property was to be interpreted exactly as it had been interpreted in arriving at the income on the analytic or cost basis,
and this had all been reported in the Parker
Report
.
'
;.
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"This matter was discussed with the representatives of the Tax Commission, and in the
first return which was filed for the Utah Copper
Company, there was no determination of depletion because there was no net income, and the
amount of the tax assessable was determined on
the basis of the values of the property.
"When the time came to take a deduction for.
depletion, the Federal law had been passed, and
it confirmed the understandings which had resulted from the studies which the Federal Bureau
had undertaken. It was exactly on that premise
that the Utah Copper Company then elected to
calculate the depletion allowance under the State
franchise tax act on the percentage basis."
It is clear from the foregoing that, in enacting
the franchise tax in 1931 providing for percentage
depletion, the Utah Legislature intended that the
then Federal practice should apply in a case such
as Kennecott's — namely, where there is no representative market or field price for the mineral products in a stage prior to that in which they are sold,
the net income from the property is the gross receipts from the actual sale of the products less all
production expenses.
In 1932 the Federal statute was amended to
104, 300, provide for percentage depletion for metal mines
478,480 at 15% of the gross income from the property but
not in excess of 50% of the net income from the
property. The Federal regulations were then rewrit89
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ten and amplified. They applied the prior practice
of determining net income in specifically prescribing that the gross income from the property was
represented by the receipts from the sale of the
mineral products less the costs of any processes or
transportation (other than those considered part
of ore extraction and concentration), except only in
the case where there was a representative market or
field price for the mineral products in a stage prior
to that in which they were actually sold. Thus, Eeg.
77, Art, 221 (g), after providing the conditions under
which a representative market or field price was to
be applied, continued:
"Where there is no such representative market or field price (as of the date of sale), then
there shall be used in lieu thereof the representative market or field price of the first marketable
product resulting from any process or processes
minus the cost (including transportation costs)
of the processes not listed below [costs of ore
extraction and concentration not deducted]."
(Material in brackets added.)

Mr. Fernald, who, as chairman of the Tax Committee of the American Mining Congress, attended
a number of meetings with the Treasury Department officials in connection with the formulation of
these new regulations with respect to percentage
depletion, testified as follows:
90
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" . . . In the discussion . . . the question had
been raised as to whether, if the mining company
itself conducted the further processes, such as
smelting, transportation, etc., the deduction should
be made for the actual cost to it for conducting
such processes or transportation, or whether there
should be addition of an amount for the profit of
conducting such an operation so as to bring the
deduction to be made up to the amount which
would have been charged if it had been conducted
by an independent concern. Secretary Douglas
stated that this would be a refinement which he
did not believe was intended and that the deduction should be only for actual cost. This would
avoid getting into a speculative field which he did
not believe was intended and he did not believe
was worth while. The regulations were written
accordingly."
•
The regulation quoted above was in effect at the
time the Utah statute was re-enacted in the Utah
Code of 1933.

Ex.
Since Kennecott's products had no representa^
15(2), tive market or field price prior to the stage in which
Tr. 452, they were actually sold, the application of the
481 amended Federal regulations would result in the
same determination as that prescribed by the Utah
statute and then applied by the Commission —
namely, deduction of all costs and expenses, except
depletion, from gross receipts to arrive at the net
income from the property.
91
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None of the foregoing Treasury regulations on
depletion for mines provided that profits should be
attributed to any processes or to transportation.
It was not until the 1940 amendment to the
Federal regulations respecting percentage depletion was adopted that mention was made in the
regulations of any deduction of profits attributable
to processes beyond the mining stage. Such amended
regulations provided as follows (Reg. 77, Art. 221
(g), as amended in 1940):
"If there is no such representative market or
field price (as of the date of sale) then there shall
be used in lieu thereof, the representative market
or field price of the first marketable product
resulting from any process or processes (or, if
the product in its crude state is merely transported, the price for which sold) minus the costs
and proportionate profits attributable to the
transportation and the processes not listed below."

483-4

However Mr. Fernald's uncontradicted testimony makes it clear that even these 1940 Treasury
regulations, providing for attribution of profits,
related only to cases where the further processes or
transportation were performed by the taxpayer
itself:
u

*

The regulations continued in this form [that
of 1932] until 1940, when the Bureau felt that the
regulations should be so changed as to require
92
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deduction not merely for the cost of the processes
or the transportation, but also for any profit
attributable to the conduct of such operations. The
Treasury Regulations were then amended to this
effect. The amended provisions were clear that
as to transportation it was only 'if transported
by the taxpayer' that 'the proportionate profits
attributable to transportation' should be subtracted from the sale price of the product to determine 'gross income from the property'. Similar
specification was not written into the regulations
with respect to any profits attributable to further
processes but this has always been understood,
and the regulations have always been so applied.
"In discussions of this question by representatives of the mining industry with the Bureau
and Treasury officials, it was definitely stated
that the requirement for deducting 'the costs and
proportionate profits attributable to the transportation and the processes not listed below'
meant and could only mean the 'proportionate
profits, if any, attributable'. It was
definitely
stated by the Treasury officials that if the transportation and the further processes were conducted by independent concerns whose charges
included any profits attributable to the conduct
of such operations, there tvould be no occasion for
increasing any such charge of an independent by
any profits of the taxpayer's attributable
thereto,
and that this was clearly the meaning and intent
of the wording used in the regulation. This has
been the consistent interpretation and procedure
followed by the Bureau." (Italics supplied.)
Thus, the 1940 change in the Federal regulations
(even if it constituted a proper basis for a change in
the application of the Utah statute enacted nine
93
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Ex.
3(2),
Tr. 89,
236, 304,
309,460,
483-4,
489

years earlier, which we deny) resulted in no change
in the computation of gross income from the property of the Utah Copper Division, since the smelting
and refining processes and transportation following
the mining operations were not performed by Kennecott but were performed by independent contractors at charges to Kennecott which took fully into
account any income or profits applicable to the conduct of and investment in such further operations.
It should be noted that the Federal law and regulations have never required attribution of profit to
sales activities conducted by a taxpayer; such attribution relates only to production processes and
transportation necessary to put the mineral product
into a marketable form.
Finally, the Federal rule as previously in effect
or as subsequently amended, does not constitute a
basis or precedent for use by the Commission of its
algebraic formula in computing percentage depletion. No such formula or procedure is in any way
authorized or applied under Federal regulations or
law.
The unfairness of the Commission's construction of the depletion provision, as applied to Kennecott, is clearly evidenced by a comparison of its
decision in this case with the rule applied by it in
the case of other mining companies.
94
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75
In the case of a majority of the metal mines,
et seq., the mining company sells its concentrates to an
487 independent smelter and receives therefor what is
et seq. termed the "net smelter return". Such net smelter
return represents the market value of the estimated
recoverable saleable metal products at the appropriate price quotations, less deduction for the
amount to be paid by the purchasing smelter to
others for the transportation, refining and other
services to be performed by others and for the
agreed amounts for the services of the smelter for
its own smelting of the products or for any other
services performed by the smelting corporation
itself.
Thus, for example, if only the smelting is performed by the smelting corporation which purchases
the concentrates, and all other services for transportation, refining and selling are performed by
others, the smelting corporation will deduct a fair
charge for its smelting (which will include allowance for its expected profit for performing the
smelting) and will deduct the amounts it will pay or
will expect to pay to others for their transportation,
refining or other services. If, however, the smelting
corporation will itself perform both the smelting
and the refining, but transportation or other services will be performed by independent concerns,
the smelting corporation will deduct a fair charge
for its smelting and its refining (which will include
95
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allowance for expected profit for performing such
services) and will deduct the amounts it will pay to
others for the services rendered by them.

Under the Utah statute, as consistently applied
by the Commission, in the case of a company so selling its concentrates to an independent smelter, the
"net income from the property" to which the percentage depletion factor is to be applied is determined by treating the net smelter return as the gross
income from the property and deducting therefrom,
to arrive at net income, the mining company's own
costs of mining, concentrating, overhead, etc. In
its Findings in this case, the Commission states:

F. 70

"If Kennecott's operations were limited to
mining (including milling of the ores) and it sold
all of its concentrates to A. S. & R., for example,
our problem would be a relatively simple one. The
cash receipts derived from the sale of concentrates would constitute the gross income from the
property from which we could subtract the costs
and expenses of mining and milling, together with
federal income and excess profits taxes attributable to the operation (see New Park Mining Co.
et al v. State Tax Commission, 113 Utah 410, 196
P. 2d 485), and the resulting figure would be the
net income from the property. Thirty-three and
one-third per cent of such net income would be
the proper amount of the deduction allowed by the
statute for depletion of the mining property."
96
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So far as the allowance for depletion is concerned, there is no substantive difference between
Kennecott's operations and those of a mining company which sells its product to an independent smelter for a net smelter return, or from the case
assumed by the Commission in the above quotation.
Kennecott, while not selling its product to an independent smelter, did not itself own or operate the
smelters or refineries, or the transportation facilities, utilized to obtain the marketable products which
it sold. For these further processes and transportation Kennecott paid a charge which embodied all of
the costs of the services so rendered and all profits
to be attributed to the rendition of those services,
just as the mining company selling its product to
the independent smelter paid for such costs and
profits through their deduction in computing the
net smelter return. Since Kennecott did not itself
conduct the activities of smelting and refining, and
related transportation, it did not have any profits
attributable thereto for the purpose of computing
percentage depletion.
There is no logical or economic justification for
treating the two situations in a different manner as
respects the application of the percentage depletion
provision.
C. The long administrative construction accorded the
percentage depletion provision and other statutory
provisions by the Commission is in accord with
that for which Kennecott contends and should be
followed.
97
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As shown above, the Utah Legislature, in adopting the percentage depletion provision in 1931,
clearly intended that the term "net income from
the property" meant (in line with the then Federal
law and regulations) total gross receipts less costs
and expenses incurred in producing a marketable
product.
For over fourteen years, after the enactment
of the statute, namely, until 1945, the Commission
itself consistently so construed the statute and during that period accepted and approved tax returns
filed by Kennecott and other taxpayers based on
the method of computing percentage depletion here
contended for by Kennecott. Neither at the time
that the franchise Tax statute was enacted in 1931
nor subsequent thereto, until the present controversy began in 1945, did anyone, so far as known
to Kennecott, least of all the Commission, contend
that under that statutory provision income should
be separately allocated to the several parts of a unified operation all of which were necessary to produce the marketable product, or that an algebraic
formula was necessary in order to arrive at the
proper allowance for depletion under the statute.
During this period the franchise tax was reenacted
without change by the Legislature in the Eevised
Statutes of Utah, 1933, c. 13, Title 80, and it was
thereafter amended in several respects, but without
changing the particular provisions with which we
are here concerned, first, by the Laws of Utah 1935,
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c. 89, and, secondly, by the Laws of Utah 1937, e.
109, the latter to define gross income. By neither
amendment was Section 80-13-21, (Sec. 59-13-20,
Utah Code 1953) with which we are here concerned,
as theretofore consistently construed and applied
by the public body charged with its administration,
changed in any respect. The State Franchise Tax
Act, without further change, was embodied in the
compilations of the Utah Code of 1943 and 1953.
This long period of administrative interpretation not only evidences a clear understanding on
the part of everyone (Legislature, Commission and
taxpayers) as to what the statute meant when it
was enacted, but, also, the acceptance by the Legislature of that application by the Commission. There
can be no basis now for departing from what was
clearly not only original legislative intent, but, also,
the practical application so given the statute by the
Commission.
Furthermore, the present decision of the Commission on this point cannot be reconciled with its
construction of the analogous language of the Utah
ad valorem tax called the "Net Proceeds Tax", Sec.
80-5-56, (Sec. 59-5-57, Utah Code 1953) which provides :
"All metalliferous mines and mining claims,
both placer and rock in place, shall be assessed at
$5.00 per acre, and in addition thereto, at a value
99
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equal to two times the net annual proceeds thereof
(italics supplied) for the calendar year next prepreceding."
The Commission has consistently taken, and
still takes, the position that the language means the
entire proceeds from the ultimate sales less related
costs and expenses, and not something less than
that figure.
The Mining Occupation tax (§ 59-5-67, Utah Code
1953) was first enacted in 1937 and was a substitute
for a part of the Net Proceeds Tax. The Net Proceeds Tax had been upon the value of the mine calculated by statute at three times the annual net proceeds; the multiple was reduced to two and the
occupation tax of " 1 % of gross amount received for
or the gross value of metalliferous ore sold" was
imposed to replace the lost value resulting from the
change in the net proceeds. Again no deduction is
allowed as for profit or income attributable to any
process, no receipts, income or profit is attributed
to any process.
«#*# ^Q Utah law for computing net proceeds of
a mine and the mine occupation tax law do not
allow any more than the cost of transportation
and smelting and refining to be deducted. It does
not seem fair or reasonable for the state to take
one position or the other according to which makes
the larger tax, and that is what it would be doing
by applying this formula." Testimony of Seymour Wells--T-r. 236*237).
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' Speaking of the net proceeds tax, the Commission itself has said in its Third Biennial Report for
the years 1935-36:
- .
;.
"The Tax Commission insisted that it was
concerned only with the gross, proceeds realized
from an actual sale of the ore, or at least the
value of the metals extracted from: the ores after
they had passed through the smelting process.
*** The company keeps separate records for each
of the different divisions of its operation, and the
profits which are made by the milling and smelting divisions are not allocated back as a profit
from the mining operation. The result is that the
milling and smelting profits are not considered
by the company to be any part of tide gross proceeds of the mine. Accordingly a lesse'r tax upon
the mine results.
"The Commission was of the opinion that the
sum realized from an actual sale should be considered as gross proceeds and also directed that
the company was entitled ta deductions for only
its 'actual costs of milling and smelting.'
#*#

"We do not recommend any legislation that
would seek to prohibit or limit the right of these
companies to pursue this method of operation.
**•* If one mining operator has developed a more
economical operation than another operator and
receives greater-net proceeds^we believe that the
ultimate consideration is the'ambunt of the net
p r o c e e d -by whatsoever method of operation
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Traits.

derived. One business man way have a more economical method of operation and may have made
a greater net profit for income tax purposes; his
tax is then based on that greater net profit. No
deduction is allowed to him because he has a more
economical method of conducting his business."
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That is exactly the way, up until March 10,1945
for the year 1942, that Kennecott's franchise tax
liability for its Utah Copper Division has been
determined by the defendant.
Similar statutes should be similarly construed.
In United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S. S. Co.,
284 U. S. 474, 52 S. Ct. 247, 76 L. ed. 408, interpretation of the Shipping Act was involved, and the
similarity in the applications there and here will be
apparent from the following quotation from the
opinion:
"*** When the Shipping Act was passed, the
Interstate Commerce Act had been in force in its
original form or in amended forms for more than
a generation. Its provisions had been applied to
a great variety of situations, and had been judicially construed in a large number and variety of
cases. *** In this situation the Shipping Act was
passed. In its general scope and purpose, as well
. as in its terms, that act closely parallels the Interstate Commerce Act; and we cannot escape the
conclusion that Congress intended that the two
acts, each in its own field, should have like interpretation, application and effect. It follows that
the settled construction in respect of the earlier
-10*
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act must be applied to the later one, unless, in
particular instances, there be something peculiar
in the question under consideration, or dissimilarity in the terms of the act relating thereto,
requiring a different conclusion."
D.

The method of computing percentage depletion
contended for by Kennecott is in accord with the
objective of this Court in Kennecott Copper Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 221 P. 2d 857.

In its opinion the Commission states that "with
respect to the issue of depletion, wTe are bound by
the ruling of the Supreme Court" in the case of
Kennecott Copper Corporation v. State Tax Commission cited supra.
However, as will be shown that decision does
not support the computation of percentage depletion here contended for by the Commission. Kennecott also submits that whatever be its interpretation that decision relates to the tax for the year
1942 solely and for subsequent taxable years the precentage depletion deduction prescribed by the
statute is to be computed as Kennecott asserts, that
is 3 3 % % of the net income from the property shall
be determined by deducting only costs and expenses
from the gross receipts from sales of the mineral
products.
The previous discussion under this Point I I
has demonstrated, we believe, that the position taken
by Kennecott is the proper interpretation of the
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statutory provision. Kennecott's construction represents a normal and logical interpretation of the
words "net income from the property" and one consistent with other uses of the term "net income
in the statute and other analogous statutes whereas
the Commission's use of an algebraic formula involving quadratics is not a computation reasonably
to be deemed to have been intended by the Legislature. Moreover, the theory of the Commission
that allocation of profits among various production
processes can properly be made in proportion to
their costs is insupportable.
Kennecott has also clearly demonstrated from
the legislative history that the Utah Legislature,
when it enacted the franchise tax in 1931 intended
the term "net income from the property" as respects depletion to have the meaning given under
the then Federal Treasury practice and in the
Parker and Shepherd Reports. As stated by Mr.
E a r l who took part in the conferences, it was this
Treasury practice and these reports that the Utah*
Tax Revision Commission and Legislature considered when they decided upon the percentage
depletion provision to be incorporated in the Utah
statute.
It has been shown that, even if the 1940 amendments to the Treasury regulations respecting percentage depletion for mines were relevant in the
construction of the Utah statute (which Eennecott
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denies), nevertheless even under these 1940 amendments and Treasury practice up to this very date,
the computation of depletion would be made in this
case as Kennecott contends. It has also been shown
that where, as here, smelting, refining and transportation are conducted by persons independent of
the taxpayer, the deduction of the cost thereof to
the taxpayer already includes the profit reasonably
attributable to such operations, since the charge
made by the processor or carrier includes both his
costs and profit.
Finally, Kennecott has shown that the Commission in applying the statute followed the interpretation of the percentage depletion provision for
whicli Kennecott here contends, from the date of
enactment of the statute in 1931 until 1945, when
the Commission in this case and for the first time
introduced its algebraic computation. Such long
continued administrative interpretation clearly evidences the Commission's understanding that the
statute was intended by the Legislature to be so
applied, and that interpretation must be deemed to
have been accepted by the Legislature when it reenacted the legislation in 1933 and thereafter
changed the franchise tax law in several respects
without changing the percentage depletion provision.
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We believe that the evidence hereinbefore summarized definitely establishes the proper construction of the percentage depletion provision in the Utah
franchise tax statute. The question at issue not
only can, but should be, now considered by the Court
on its merits. This Court remanded the case for
that purpose.
In the 1942 case a number of issues were
brought before this Court, some of which were
decided by the Court and one of which was referred
back to the Commission.
The Court there decided two points not directly
involving depletion. It held that Federal subsidies
(premiums or bonus payments for emergency mineral
production) were includable in income for franchise
tax purposes. It also held that the Utah franchise
tax was properly computed upon the net income
of the Utah Copper Division alone, instead of on the
entire net income of Kennecott from all of its divisions. There is no dispute in the present case as to
either of these points.
As to depletion for the year 1942, the Court
decided two additional points. One was that Kennecott should compute depletion under the statutory
provision of 33%% of net income, and not on some
different basis, since in filing its tax returns Kennecott had elected to follow percentage depletion
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and had not made a timely request or shown a substantial reason for a change in method. This point
is not involved in the present case.
The other point relative to depletion decided
by the Court was the question as to whether net
income subject to depletion should be computed
before deducting Federal taxes, as had been the
accepted procedure in earlier years, or after deducting such Federal taxes. The Court sustained the
latter position. This point is no longer in dispute,
and Kennecott's present contentions give full effect
in the computation of the depletion allowance, to the
deduction of Federal taxes.
The major part of the Court's opinion was devoted to the foregoing questions. The Court then
proceeded to consider the calculation of the 33%%
depletion allowance. The opinion of the Court on
this point concludes as follows:
"We need not place our approval on the
formula used by the Commission or arbitrarily
determine the break-through point between mining operations and post-mining activities. All we
need do in this case is to point out that there are
two possible paths for the taxpayer to take. The
Commission might agree that it take either but
it cannot traverse both. Either the net income
is from the property and should be allocated to
this state, or the net income is from both the
property and the post-mining activities and they
are not so related that the net income cannot be
roughly allocated to both sources. The lengths to
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which the taxpayer might go under its theory is
aptly illustrated by the figures used in its first
return." Frorri an appproximate net income, before
depletion, in this stette of $18,000,000, Kennecott
seeks to establish a depletion allowance of $13,,: 000,000, This is far in excess of the 3 3 % % provided for by statute.
•'"In disposing of this last contention, we hold
that if Kennecott files its return on an allotted
basis that it must allocate some of its net income
to post-mining operations before computing depletion.
"The case is remanded with instructions to
determine and enter a deficiency judgment in
accordance with the views herein expressed."
As will be noted, while the case was remanded
with instructions to enter a deficiency judgment,
the Court expressly stated that it was not placing
its approval upon the formula employed by the
Commission. Accordingly, the computation of the
depletion provision for 1942 remained to be made
by the Commission, and the formula and its application Continued subject to judicial review.
Mo
a full reading of the opinion of
the Court it would seem that in stating "if Kennecott files its return on an alloted basis . . . it must
allocate!'some of its net income to post-mining operations before computing depletion", the Court acted
under the belief that Kennecott was taking an inconsistent position and that (even after allowance
for Federal taxes) if its contention were sustained,
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Kennecott would receive in the calculation of the
Utah tax the benefit of a depletion allowance very
substantially in excess of 33%% of its net income,
before depletion, allocated to Utah.
Nowhere in its opinion does the Court mention
the evidence and arguments outlined above bearing
on the interpretation of the depletion provision.
Rather, it apparently assumed that, in computing
depletion, some attribution of profits to post-mining
activities was essential to prevent Kennecott from
"eating its cake and having it too" through allocating to Utah only a portion of its net income arising out of the sale of its mineral products, while at
the same time claiming as a deduction from such
portion of net income a depletion allowance equal
to 33%% of its entire net income allocable both
within and without the State of Utah.
Thus, the Court stated in the above portion of
its opinion: "from an approximate net income,
before depletion, in this State of $18,000^000, Kennecott seeks to establish a depletion allowance of
$13,000,000. This is far in excess of the 33y3% provided for by the statute." Again, on page 865, the
Court states:
"If the total net income were allocated to this
state then we might be faced with the difficult
question as to whether we were not on the one
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hand permitting the post-mining operations to
increase the franchise tax due the state and on
the other hand denying the taxpayer the right to
the increased income for depletion calculations.
However, when the taxpayer allocates the net
income received from the appreciation to out of
state net income, another question presents itself."
The Court thus recognized that if the income
from post-mining (as well as mining) operations
were allocated to Utah and thus served to increase
the net income before depletion used in computing
the Utah tax, it would be unfair to deny to the taxpayer a deduction of 33%% of all such income
assigned to Utah. The Court felt it unnecessary
finally to decide this question. It evidently regarded
the case before it as one where, unless corrected
in the depletion allowance itself, any income from
out-of-state post-mining operations would serve to
increase the depletion deductible against Utah net
income, while at the same time such post-mining
income would remain free of the Utah tax because
allocated outside of the State.

This view of the Court is also evidenced by the
other statement from the Court's opinion quoted
above and by computations made by it earlier in its
opinion. In that quotation the Court assumes that
against an approximate net income before depletion,
allocated to Utah, of $18,000,000, Kennecott sought
110
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to establish a depletion allowance of $13,000,000.#
This the Court pointed out was far in excess of
331/3% of the former figure. The sum of $18,000,000, given by the Court as Utah net income before
depletion, is evidently the Court's approximation
of the sum of $5,803,351 appearing earlier in the
opinion (which it deemed to represent net income
after depletion allocated by Kennecott to Utah) and

* It should also be recognized that this $13,000,000
figure for depletion, claimed on the original tax
return and used by the Court, did not give effect
to the deduction of Federal taxes required by the
Court's decision or certain other necessary adjustments, all of which are corrected in the computation of depletion now claimed by Kennecott. Kennecott now claims depletion in the amount of
$7,938,367 upon $23,815,102, which latter amount
both the Commission and Kennecott agree is the
correct total net income from mineral products
before depletion. This results in $15,876,735 total
net income from mineral products after depletion.
Adding to this amount the small amount of income
from sources other than mineral production,
makes $16,061,627 net income after depletion
which is subject to allocation to Utah according
to the three-factor formula. Applying the allocation factor of 66.926% used in the 1942 case, the
net income from mineral products after depletion allocated to Utah would be $10,625,664. (This
is before taking into account any sundry income.)
The foregoing should be taken into account in
any consideration of the figures given in the
Court's decision.
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$13,568,213 (representing the total amount claimed
by Kennecott as depletion). Evidently the Court
regarded Kennecott as contending that the entire
amount of depletion was deductible against the portion of net income before depletion allocable to Utah,
otherwise there could be no occasion for adding the
two figures. This is not and never was Kennecott's
contention.
On the contrary, Kennecott's contention on this
point conforms with what we regard as the view of
this Court, when it is recognized that, under the
statutory method for calculating the tax, the depletion allowance itself is subject to the same allocation
under the three-factor formula as is the net income
before depletion. The statute provides for the determination of total income before depletion and then
for the deduction therefrom of 33%% of this amount
(as Kennecott contends), thus arriving at total net
income after depletion. This amount is then allocated within and without the State of Utah in
accordance with the prescribed three-factor formula.
Mathematically, the resulting net income, taxed in
Utah, is the same as if the allocation had been made
by applying the three-factor formula separately to
total net income before depletion and to the depletion allowance itself, and then deducting the depletion so allocated to Utah from the net income before
depletion so allocated to this State.* Accordingly,
* This is readily demonstrated by the use of
rounded-out figures approximating those claimed
by Kennecott for the year 1942 — namely total
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Kenneeott's method of determining depletion, when
combined with the allocation prescribed by the threefactor formula, results in charging for depletion
against Utah income, in determining the Utah tax,
only 33%% of the net income before depletion which
is allocated to Utah. This we believe is in accord
with the rationale of the Court's decision.

net income (before depletion) from mineral production of $24,000,000, (in lieu of $23,815,102) and
an allocation factor of 67% (in lieu of 66.926%) of
net income after depletion under the three-factor
formula. In such case, under Kenneeott's contention, the net income subject to the franchise
tax in Utah would be computed under the statute
as follows:
Table I
Total net income before depletion
Depletion allowance (33%% of total
net income before depletion)
Total net income after depletion

$24,000,000
8,000,000
$16,000,000

Net income after depletion allocated
to Utah (67% of total net income
after depletion)
$10,720,000
As will be noted, the net income after depletion
allocated to Utah in Table I is the same as that
obtained in Table II by allocating separately net
income before depletion and the depletion allowance.
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On the other hand, the method advocated by the
Commission would result in a depletion deduction
applicable against Utah income substantially less
than 33y3% of the net income before depletion allocated to Utah. This is because application of the
three-factor formula results in allocating to Utah
only a portion of the Commission's reduced allowance for depletion. The Court seems to have overlooked the fact that the Commission's method of
computing depletion results in a double reduction of
the depletion allowance — first, limitation of the

Table II
Total net income before depletion

$24,000,000

Net income before depletion, allocated to Utah (67% of total net
income before depletion)
16,080,000
Total depletion allowance (33%%
of total net income before depletion)
$8,000,000
Depletion allowance allocated to
Utah (67% of total depletion
allowance)

5,360,000

Net income after depletion, allocated to Utah (net income before
depletion allocated to Utah less
depletion allowance to Utah) .......... 10,720,000
As will be noted the depletion allowance allocated
to Utah is 33%% of net income before depletion
allocated to Utah.
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depletion allowance to a percentage of only the net
income attributable to ore extraction and concentration and second, the allocation outside of Utah of
a portion of this reduced allowance by the application of the three-factor formula.
The only substantial business done by Kennecott
itself within Utah was that of ore extraction* ^and
concentration. It is the net income fairly attributable to this portion of the business which the
statutory formula seeks to ascertain as the basis
for the imposition of the franchise tax, and it wais
such income fairly attributable to the State at which
the Court was seeking to arrive. As is evident from
what has preceded, the method of computing depletion contended for by the Commission, in computing
the Utah tax, deprives Kennecott of depletion equal
to 33%% of the net income before depletion from
its aggregate mining operation and thus deprives
Kennecott of its property without due process of
law. It thus pro tanto serves to impose the tax on
a return of capital rather than upon income. We do
not regard the decision of the Court in the 1942 case
as intending, much less requiring, any such result.
Kennecott accordingly maintains that the decision in the 1942 case does not sustain the Commission's decision as to the depletion allowance in this
case, and that the history of the adoption, interpretation and application of the Utah statute does not
admit such a decision as would support the allowUS
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ance now determined by the Commission. On the
contrary, the depletion claimed by Kennecott is in
accord with the historical purpose and intent of the
statute and its application and, we believe, accords
with the rationale of the Court's decision in the 1942
case.

in.
Point.
For the calendar year 1942 the Commission must
obey the mandate of this Court in Case No. 7298,
entitled Kennecott Copper Corporation et al, v. State
Tax Commission, 221 P. 2d 857. The Commission's
attempt here to change the allocation of Kennecott's
net income within and without the State of Utah for
the purpose of the State Franchise Tax for that year,
and otherwise to exceed, modify and elaborate upon
that mandate, is beyond it's power.
This Court's decision in Kennecott Copper
Corporation et al v. State Tax Commission, supra,
related to Kennecott's tax for the calendar year
1942 only, and thereby it was finally adjudicated
that:

..
•7-..-

1. Subsidy payments made by the Federal
government for Kennecott's over-quota production
must.be included in Kennecott's gross income.
116
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2. * Federal taxes must be deducted in determining Kennecott's net income, 33%%: of which,
under the statute, represents the depletion allowance. • "
,:.:'!••:••
3. The Commission had not acted arbitrarily
or capriciously in denying Kenheeott's request to
amend its 1942 franchise tax return by changing its
method of reporting from the Utah Copper Divisional basis to that encompassing the operations of
Kennecott's several divisions.
4. The Commission did not act arbitrarily in
refusing to allow Kennecott to amend its 1942 return by changing from percentage depletion to a
cost or other basis.
*•• '
5» In its. return for the calendar year 1942
. Kennecott applied and followed the statutory allocation formula, which the Commission had applied
••;,::•"••"

and followed in the settlement of 1942 for the years
:

;

1935 to 1941, inclusive^ and to which the Commission
had adhered ever since the passage of the franchise
tax statute March 12, 1931, and the Commission

.

represented in this Court in its Case No. 7298 and
Kennecott there conceded .that if confined to the
- Utah Copper DivisianaL-basis,: the .allocation so
. *:. arrived at was correct•.;; and this Court a4^pted the

A, i .Co^i^issi^nX&di^g'S a&c&l^ngl^. .:•;,.;• :..;;.;
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6. This Court remanded the 6ase to the Commission only to find depletion and therein "to determine and render a deficiency judgment in accordance with the "views" expressed by the Court in its
opinion. Therein the Court refrained from placing
its approval on the formula used by the Commission
in its computation of depletion.
The judgment of this Court in Case No. 7298
wherein final is res adjudicata for the year 1942,
and all issues raised herein pertaining to the succeeding years await disposition as new and separate
causes, consolidated here only for purpose of hearing and review.
The factor found by the Commission as well as
by Kennecott to apply to total net income in order
to obtain the portion thereof attributable to business done in the State of Utah was 66.926 per cent.
Both parties having agreed upon and used that
allocation factor for assignment of net income derived from business done in Utah, that factor was
accepted by this Court and that question was accordingly settled and disposed of by this Court. In that
allocation factor of 66.926 per cent the full 100 per
cent of sales was assigned outside Utah, this by
both Kennecott and the Commission, and that factor was accordingly accepted by this Court for the
purpose of its decision. The determination of that
factor by this Court is binding for the year 1942
and the Commission's attempt to assign .100 per
US
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cent of sales to Utah and thus to increase the allocation factor to Utah to 97.749 per cent is an endeavor
to raise again an already determined issue.

5C.J.S.:
§ 1964, pages 1499, 1501:
"a.

In General.

"The decision of a reviewing court becomes
the law of the case as to all matters properly
within the scope thereof and controls in all subsequent trials or proceedings.
u##

* The rule is especially applicable where
the appellate court has remanded the cause with
specific directions as to the steps to be taken by
the lower court * # * and such rule holds good regardless of whether the decision of the appellate
court is right or wrong. * # *
"* # # matters once determined by the appellate court cannot, after remand, be again raised
and relitigated in the lower court."
§ 1969, page 1526:
"After determination on appeal and remand
to the lower court, a party will not be allowed so
to plead as to open up matters already adjudicated by the appellate court, nor will he be
allowed, without showing a sufficient reason
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therefor, even under statute, to plead matters
which existed and were known by him at the time
of the first trial and might then have been pleaded
by him."
§ 1971, page 1528:
"The findings cannot be corrected after remand with directions.
"Where a cause is remanded with directions,
the lower court cannot correct alleged errors in
the findings of fact or amend by making additional findings."
§1993, page 1557:
§1993.

Effect.

"Failure of the trial court to follow the decision or comply with the mandate of the appellate
court constitutes reversible error."
That such is the law of Utah is plainly evident
from the following decisions of this Court:
Helper State Bank v. Crus, 95 Utah 320, 81 P.
2nd 359.
"It is a well established rule in this jurisdiction, as well as in a majority of other jurisdictions, that where the questions of law and fact are
the same the decision of the first appeal, whether
• right or wrong, becomes the law of the case on
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second appeal and is binding as well on the parties
to the action, the trial court, and the appellate
court. To this effect was Venard v. Green, 4 Utah
456, 11 P. 337; Societe des Mines v. Mackintosh,
7 Utah 35, 24 P. 669; Krantz v. Eio Grande Ry.
Co., 13 Utah 1, 43 P. 623, 32 L.R.A. 828; Brim v.
Jones, 13 Utah 440, 45 P. 46, 352; Silva v. Pickard,
14 Utah 245, 47 P. 144; People's B. & L. Ass'n v.
Fowble, 18 Utah 206, 55 P. 57; Potter v. Ajax
Mining Co., 22 Utah 273, 61 P. 999; Herriman
Irrigation Co. v. Keel, 25 Utah 96, 69 P. 719;
State v. Mortensen, 27 Utah 16, 74 P. 120, 350;
Corporation of Members of L.D.S. v. Watson, 30
Utah 126, 83 P. 731; Teakle v. San Pedro Railroad Co. 36 Utah 29, 102 P. 623, 639; Grand Central Mining Co. v. Mammoth M. Co., 36 Utah 364,
104 P. 573, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 254; Grow v. Oregon
S.L.Ry.Co., 47 Utah 26, 150 P. 970; Chadwick v.
Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 56 Utah 480, 191 P. 240;
Thompson v. Reynolds, 59 Utah 416, 204 P. 516;
Huntsman v. Huntsman, 61 Utah 376, 213 P. 179;
Forbes v. Butler, 73 Utah 522, 275 P. 772; Utah
State Nat. Bank v. Livingston, 74 Utah 456, 280
P. 327; Sessions v. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n,
94 Utah 460, 78 P. 2d 645.
"*** where an appellate court disposes of the
entire case by directing just what judgment shall
be entered, then the case is finally disposed of,
and no new issues can be raised, and the only
thing that can be determined on another appeal
is whether the trial court has followed those directions. And under those conditions, if any party
has failed to take an appeal or failed to raise any
issue which it might have raised, it is too late,
because the appellate court has finally disposed
of the case."
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To the cases there cited may be added the following:
Bolognese v. Anderson et al, 97 Utah 136, 90 P.
2d 275:
u

On the former appeal this court unanimously
determined the tax deed to be invalid on the record before it but reversed the action and granted
a new trial for other reasons. So far as the tax
proceedings are concerned we are convinced that
the facts now disclosed by the record remain
essentially the same as they appeared when the
case was here before. Such being the case we are
precluded from again passing on a question which
was presented, considered and passed upon before
by this court, by force of the doctrine of the law
of the case. 5 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, page
1499, 1508, § 1964, and cases there cited. See also
Forbes v. Butler, 73 Utah 522, 275 P. 772; Utah
State National Bank v. Livingston, 74 Utah 456,
280 P. 327; Clark v. Los Angeles & S.L.R. Co.,
73 Utah 486, 275 P. 582; Grow v. Oregon Short
Line R. Co., 47 Utah 26, 150 P. 970."
Powerine Co. v. Zion's Savings Bank & Trust
Co. et al, 106 Utah 384,148 P. 2d 807:
"On retrial the District Court, evidently misapplying the decision of this court on the former
appeal, made new findings of fact and conclusions
of law on matters settled by the opinion of this
court. It then made further findings covering the
question of rentals for which the cause had been
remanded. Since the findings, conclusions and
judgment on the retrial, except as to rentals, were
at variance and contrary to the decision of this
%
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court on the former appeal, and against the plaintiff who prevailed as to those matters on that
appeal, it brings this appeal.
"We shall not review our pronouncements heretofore made in this case, nor shall we discuss the
errors assigned, as they deal with matters discussed in the previous opinion, and upon which
no new determination should have been made by
the trial court, except by way of entering findings
to conform to the previous opinion. Forbes v.
Butler, 73 Utah 522, 275 P. 772.***
Our pronouncements are the law of the case,
binding no less upon us than upon the lower
court."
Phebus et al v. Dunford, Judge, et al, 198 P.
2d 973.
Street et al v. Fourth Judicial District Court,
Utah County et al, 113 Utah 60,191 P. 2d 153:
"As a general rule, where a judgment or
decree is affirmed or reversed and remanded with
directions to enter a particular judgment, the
trial court may not permit amended or supplemental pleadings to be framed to try rights already settled. 9 Bancroft, op. cit. Sec. 7430. This
rule is not only reasonable, but necessary, if litigation is ever to come to an end. After an appellate court has once ruled upon issues presented
to it, such ruling becomes the law of the case, and
the trial court is bound to follow it, even though
it considers the ruling erroneous."
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• T h e matter of assigning 100 per cent of sales
outside Utah for the calendar year 1942 was settled
in favor of such assignment by agreement of the
parties and its adoption accordingly by this Court.
When the Commission was reinvested with jurisdiction of that cause by the decision and mandate
of this. Court, a limited power was restored to the
Commission to find the correct amount of depletion for that year and to do only that. The Commission certainly was not reinvested with jurisdiction
to repudiate its agreement upon which the Court
had settled and disposed of that issue, and in direct
contradiction of the Commission's position then
taken and acted upon, to assign to Utah 100 per
cent of. Kenneeott's sales. For the year 1942 the
authority of this Commission must be confined to
the computation of depletion as then directed by
this Court.

As to depletion, by its decision and mandate
this Court reinvested the Commission with power
and authority to compute depletion under the statutory provisions and to make that computation only.
This Court withheld its approval of the algebraic
formula devised by the Commission for that purpose, and said:
:
"If Kennecott files its return on an allotted
basis:•** it must allocate some of its net income
to post-mining operations before computing depletion."
.:..•••••;...:..
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As discussed in Subsection D of Point II of
this brief, Kennecott submits that its method of
computing the depletion deduction is in accordance
with this Court's objective, and that the Commission's method is contrary thereto.
IV.
Point.
Under the facts and circumstances here disclosed
the Commission is not empowered to assess interest
on deficiencies, if any, adjudged against Kennecott,
and its attempt to do so here is an abuse of the discretion vested in it by the statute.
Over and above the Commission's demand for
additional payments by way of its claimed tax deficiencies for the years 1942 to 1950 both inclusive,
the Commission claims interest, which, as of June
15, 1953 it asserts amounted to the sum of $1,283,647.81.
Kennecott had no word of this approaching
controversy until March 10, 1945 when the Commission proposed adjustments for the calendar year
1942. Kennecott had made its return for each the
years 1942 to 1944 both inclusive, upon the statutory
allocation formula and depletion calculation in
accord with the settlement of May 27, 1942 for the
years 1935 to 1941 inclusive. The Commission computed this interest on the claimed deficiencies for
each of the years 1942-1950 both inclusive, from the
15th day of March of each year. It makes no dif125
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ference to the Commission that the statute, Section
59-13-25, Utah Code 1953, prescribes quarterly payments on March 15, June 15, September 15, December 15, and that interest shall be computed upon
such quarterly amounts from those dates, respectively. Section 59-13-28, Utah Code 1953. It is stated
by the Commission that the final amount of interest
to be payable will ultimately depend upon the
amount of tax finally found to be owing.
This controversy began March 10,1945, with the
Commission's proposed adjustments for the calendar
year 1942. The issue revolved mainly about the
depletion calculation. On January 22,1948, the Commission rendered its decision for the year 1942,
again as to the depletion calculation, whereupon
Kennecott carried the case to this Court for review,
the controversy still revolving about depletion. This
is Case No. 7298, already discussed, wherein a decision was rendered August 24,1950, and the case was
remanded to the Commission to find depletion and
render a deficiency judgment in accord with the
views expressed by this Court,
From March 10, 1945 to this day, within the
period allowed by the statute, the Commission has
proposed adjustments with relation to the depletion
calculation, by consistent recourse to its algebraic
formula, and Kennecott has duly filed with the Commission its several petitions for redetermination
directed to the Commission's proposed deficiencies.
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Trans.

On March 10, 1951, applicable to the year 1948
only, the Commission in its then proposed adjustments for the first time and without explanation
repudiated the statutory three-factor formula and
substituted therefor its algebraic formula by which
to compute the portion of Kennecott's net income
allocable to Utah by which to measure the Utah
State franchise tax.
On June 29, 1951, Commission filed amended
proposed adjustments for each the years 1942 to
1950, both inclusive, using for each year, in lieu of
the three-factor statutory formula, the Commission's
algebraic formula by which to compute the portion
of Kennecott's net income allocable to Utah by
which to measure the franchise tax. The aggregate
tax deficiency as computed by the Commission was
then stated by it to amount to the sum of $2,712,015.04, upon which it computed interest from August
1st of the year in which the returns were respectively due to August 1, 1951 in the sum of
$596,081.10.
Ex.
On December 4, 1951, the opening day of the
A (2), hearing below, the Commission recomputed interest
Tr. 4-5 from the due date of the return for each of the years
1942 to 1950 both inclusive, to December 15, 1951,
then stating the tax deficiency to be the sum of
$2,712,915.47, and interest to be the sum of $707r
481.37, While still using its algebraic formula for
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the depletion calculation and as well for the allocation to Utah for purpose of the tax, the Commission reserved "the right to this Commission and to
the Supreme Court if this case again reaches the
Supreme Court, to amend the deficiencies by asserting tax based on 100 percent of the Utah Division's
net income."
On April 2, 1952, in the middle of the hearing
below, the Commission concluded that its "primary
obligation in this case is to follow the Utah statute
***. We have no reason nor can we fail to follow
the express and explicit terms of our statute."
Therefore, the Commission concluded it must abandon its algebraic formula for the computation of
that part of Kennecott's net income allocable to
Utah by which the Utah tax would be measured,
although retaining that algebraic formula for the
depletion calculation. However, in lieu of the algebraic formula for allocation of net income to Utah,
the Commission proceeded to assign to Utah 100
per cent of Kennecott's sales, every one of which
had been negotiated, effected and concluded in states
other than Utah. The tax deficiency was then
stated by the Commission to be $3,848,439.68, and
interest computed to December 15, 1951, to be
$1,033,275.71.
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The decision of the Commission under date of
July 23, 1953 assigned all sales to Utah, except only
those of gold and silver, and stated the tax deficiency to be $3,568,041.92, and interest computed to
June 15, 1953 to be $1,283,647.81. Sales of gold and
silver were assigned out of Utah because made by
Kennecott itself instead of by Kennecott Sales
Corporation acting on Kennecott's behalf.
Kennecott duly returned its net income for the
State franchise tax as calculated under the statutory three-factor formula required both by the
statute and as the statute had been interpreted by
the Commission over the years 1935 to 1941 inclusive, and prior thereto from the enactment of the
statute, March 12, 1931. Kennecott paid the franchise tax for each of the years 1942 to 1950 inclusive, here involved, as so returned, and made those
several paymefnts at the times required by the
statute. Kennecott has paid to the State of Utah as
much of the claimed tax as it could, with due regard
to the lawfulness of the Commission's demand.
With this over-all picture, the Commission insists on a judgment against Kennecott for the item
of interest on whatever deficiency may be ultimately adjudged against Kennecott, should there be
any, computed from March 15th of the year wherein
the return was due, quite regardless of its subsequent proposed adjustments and the subsequent
amendments of such proposals.
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The Utah statute provides as follows:
59-13-28. "Deficiency - Interest. — Interest
upon the amount determined as a deficiency shall
be assessed at the same time as the deficiency,
shall be paid upon notice and demand from the tax
commission, and shall be collected as a part of the
tax at the rate of six per cent per annum from the
date prescribed for the payment of the tax to the
date the deficiency is assessed."
59-13-57. "Power to waive or reduce penalty
or interest. Upon making a record of its reasons
therefor, the tax commission shall have the power,
in its discretion, to waive or reduce any of the
penalties or interest provided in this chapter or
to compromise the same."

It is stated in 51 American Jurisprudence, page
849, Section 970;
"Penalties for nonpayment of taxes often
take the form of the imposition of interest charges
on the delinquent amounts unpaid, but neither
interest nor any other form of pecuniary penalty
may be exacted for delay in payment of taxes
unless authority therefor is given by legislative
enactment."
page 851, Section 974, as follows:
"A taxpayer should not be charged with
penalties or with interest for nonpayment of taxes
until he has had opportunity to pay them. In case
of real property, for example, he should not be
charged with penalties until there has been an
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identification of the property subject to taxation
and a determination of the amount of taxes due
upon it."
page 853, Section.975, as follows:
"*** Moreover where there is necessity for
resort to litigation to determine the validity of the
tax, and particularly where the taxing authorities
are the moving parties in the litigation, or agree
to submit the question to the decision of the court,
the courts have refused to hold the taxpayer liable
for penalties and interest upon so much of the tax
as is finally determined to be valid against him.
This is upon the theory that payment of taxes to
which the state may not be rightfully entitled
should not be coerced under threat of penalty. ***
"The cases which recognize that a taxpayer
may escape liability for penalties or interest
where his failure to pay a tax when due is because
of his contention in good faith that he is not liable
for the tax,*** do not require as an element of
good faith that the taxpayer be upheld in his contention; but if his insistence is frivolous, malicious and unreasonable so as to be arbitrary and
. clearly show conduct not prompted by good faith,
it will be ineffective and of no avail."
page 855, Section 978, as follows:
"Statutes providing for the remission or reduction of penalties, interest charges, and costs
imposed upon delinquent taxpayers are liberally
construed in favor of the taxpayer. The grant to
tax officers of power to remit penalties for tax
delinquencies includes power to remit interest
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charges imposed by statute in respect of delinquent taxes, such charges being in the nature of
penalties."
61 Corpus Juris, page 1518, Section 2227, as
follows:
"The circumstances attending the nonpayment of taxes may be such as to warrant the
courts in refusing to enforce payment of interest
imposed by statutes on delinquent taxpayers."
and Section 2229, as follows:
"Construction of such statutes. Statutes for
remission of interest, being remedial in character,
should be liberally construed, and extended to all
cases fairly coming within the reason or rule
thereof; and although permissive in form should
be given a mandatory effect."
It cannot have been and, as shown by the statutory provisions quoted above, was not the intention
of the Legislature to coerce, by threat of a heavy
penalty should a taxpayer resort to this Court, the
payment of taxes to which the State may not be
rightly entitled. It is Kennecott's right to submit
this litigation to this Court for review on both facts
and law.
Under all the circumstances it is the Commission's duty in this case to waive interest, as it is
, empowered by ,the statute.
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The following authorities demonstrate that such
a power to waive interest to avoid injustice cannot
be arbitrarily withheld, but that under such circumstances the power must be exercised,.
It was held in Commonwealth v. Southern Pac.
Co., 169 Ky. 296, 183 S.W. 925, that:
".Two questions are presented for decision:
First, may the interest and penalties provided by
the statute for failure to pay taxes on or before
the 1st of December be exacted from the taxpayer
where he exercises his statutory right to appeal
from the action of the board of supervisors in
assessing his property if his appeal so taken is
not acted upon by the quarterly court until after
the 1st of December following, the time which the
statute fixes for the interest and penalty to
attach! Second, is it incumbent upon a taxpayer
taking such an appeal to tender any taxes, the
amount of which has not been ascertained?
"The first proposition resolves itself into
the question whether the taxpayer is delinquent
until he has had an opportunity to voluntarily pay
his taxes, and which have previously been definitely fixed or the amount of which could have
been by him, approximately ascertained before
the penalty attaches. In this case, *** as long as
the appeals were pending in the. quarterly court
it was impossible for the company,io know what
the final amount: of the assessment might be, and
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it would have been nothing short of a reckless
guess for it to have undertaken to approximately
fix the amount of its taxes for any one of the
years involved, so as to have tendered the same
before the interest and penalty attached,
•••

«### Here the taxpayer did not know what
he hkd to pay until the final assessment was made
by the quarterly court. *** If under these conditions the agency selected by the state to finally
assess the property fails to assess it before the
time fixed for the interest and penalties to attach,
will this failure be allowed to operate so as to
penalize the taxpayer? So far as this record
shows, the appellee is not responsible for this
delay; it only exercised a right expressly granted
by the statute. The commonwealth was the moving party, and it would seem to be its duty to
urge such proceedings to a speedy determination,
and if it fails to do so before the interest and
penalties attach, it would be inequitable and unjust to enforce their collection.
"At any rate, the state agency charged with
the duty of finally assessing this property on the
appeal failed to discharge that duty, for some
reason not entirely apparent from this record,
before the time fixed for the interest and penalties to attach, and that failure should not be permitted to operate so as to penalize a taxpayer for
not paying his taxes before his property has been
finally assessed, and before he could possibly
know their amount. To do so would be to penalize
a taxpayer for exercising the right of appeal
which the statute expressly gives him. Clearly it
could not have been the legislative purpose to
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exact from a taxpayer a penalty for failure to pay
his taxes when the agency selected by the state
for that purpose has not assessed his property in
time for him to have voluntarily paid the tax in
time to escape the penalty. To so interpret the
statute would be to convict the General Assembly
of a deliberate purpose to do a palpable wrong
to the taxpayers, and this we do not believe and
are not authorized to infer. It follows from what
we have said that the statute could not have intended that the interest and penalties should be
exacted when the taxpayer has had no opportunity to voluntarily pay his taxes before they
ordinarily attach under its terms.
"Before the board of supervisors the company
filed each year a statement giving what it conceived to be the assessable value of the floating
equipment to the company, but contending all
along that the taxable situs was not in Jefferson
county, and it is now strenuously insisted that,
after taking the various appeals to the quarterly
court, it was obligatory upon the part of the company to at least tender the taxes pending the
appeals to the quarterly court on the conceded
valuation of the property.
«#•• Undoubtedly it is not only within the
power of a chancellor, but it is his duty, when
being so applied to, to put the applicant upon
such terms as will not delay the prompt collection of taxes which he concedes to be due; but
the quarterly court occupied a very different attitude. It was only a state agency, acting in £
ministerial capacity in the assessment of property
under our assessment and taxation statute. It had
no power to enter any judgment for taxes. It had
no authority to put the company upon any sort
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of terms before it would hear its appeal. Its sole
power is, under the statute, to determine whether
the property is or not assessable, and, if so, what
is its assessable value.
"The statute requires no tender, and puts no
condition whatever upon the right of appeal; and,
while it is apparent that it was contemplated by
the statute that an appeal would, under ordinary
circumstances, be disposed of in time for the
taxpayer to pay his taxes without incurring the
interest and penalties, yet there is no provision
fixing the time within which the quarterly court
shall dispose of such an appeal; and, if that
agency so selected by the state fails to dispose of
such an appeal and make the final assessment so
that the taxpayer would have an opportunity to
escape such penalty and interest, manifestly the
taxpayer should not be penalized because of such
failure, and should not be expected to make a
tender of an amount which has not been ascertained, and which necessarily is indefinite and
uncertain,
"The suggestion that the taxes on the conceded valuation might have been tendered to the
sheriff is untenable. The assessment was not
final. **#
"It is apparent from the whole record that
the delay in the quarterly court was either because
of the failure of the commonwealth to push to a
speedy determination a proceeding which it had
instituted to assess this property, or because of
the mutual acquiescence in such delay by all
parties. •
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"Judgment affirmed."
State v. Coos County, 115 Ore. 300, 237 P. 678,
the court held :
"We are of the opinion that the words used,
to wit, 'The county courts of the several counties
of the state may and are hereby authorized to
remit/ etc., when used in the connection in which
they appear in the act, should be construed as
mandatory. While in form permissible, they are
peremptory when used to clothe a public officer
with the power to do an act which ought to be done
for the sake of justice, or which concerns the
public interest or the rights of third persons. Ex
parte Banks, 28 Ala, 28; Rex v. Barlow, 2 Salk.
609; Johnston v. Pate, 95 N.C. 68; Lynn v. County
Com'rs, 148 Mass. 148, 19 N.E. 171; Bowen v.
Minneapolis, 47 Minn. 115, 49 N.W. 683, 28 Am.
St. Rep. 333; and various other authorities to
that effect, which will be found in a note to section 636, vol. 2 (2d Ed.) Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction."
Commenting upon the case of Commonwealth
v. Southern Pacific Company, supra, the court said
in Bingham's Administrator v. Commonwealth, 196
Ky. 257, 244 S.W. 781, at 791:
"The tax due in that case (Commonwealth v.
Southern Pacific Company, supra), a franchise
tax, before it became due by or collectible from
the owner, had to be assessed against it in some
one of the several ways in which property is
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assessed for taxation, and the owner was not
delinquent in any duty imposed upon him by law
until such assessment was ascertained according
to law. The property of the owner having been
assessed against it by the board of equalization at
an exorbitant figure, the owner, as the law gave
it the right to do before the assessment became
final, appealed to the quarterly court for review
of the board's assessment. The quarterly court
materially reduced the assessment, and the owner
promptly paid the taxes thus found to be due. We
held that the owner should not be required to pay
penalties when it was not delinquent in its duty
to pay the taxes it owed; that it was not delinquent during the pendency of the appeal to the
quarterly court, as the law gave it that right; and,
that to charge it interest and other penalties the
law imposed for delinquency would be unfair and
was not intended, although another and general
law provided that all taxes, unless otherwise
specially provided, should be due on the 1st day
of March after assessment, and become delinquent if not paid on the 1st day of December
thereafter."
And it was held in Commonwealth v. Bingham's
Administrator, 187 Ky. 749, 220 S. W. 727, at 730,
as follows:
"•*** The law neither demands nor expects
the impossible, nor will a court by its decree
penalize a person for the nonpayment of a tax,
the amount of which is not only uncertain, but at
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the present time is still undetermined, and this
through no fault of the party sought to be
charged. ***
"We are told that a wide expanse of time and
territory were covered in the proof taking, after
which the appraiser filed a voluminous report.
This being true, should we charge a dereliction of
duty to appellee because the overworked court,
to whom the matter was submitted, has not had
time to render a decision ? We think not. Appellee
is without fault in the premises, and we are unable
to find wherein it has failed or neglected to perform any duty required of it.
•••

"As said in State v. Certain Lands in Redwood County, 40 Minn. 512,42 N. W. 473 :
" 'A penalty for the nonpayment of a tax cannot be imposed until the person has an opportunity to pay it, and fails to do so.'"
And in Bingham's Administrator v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 402, 251 S. W. 936, it was said:
"Upon the question of interest upon the
amount of the tax as finally determined, the circuit judge, in his written opinion upon which the
judgment is based, has so accurately analyzed the
cases from this court upon the question and so
admirably stated the rules deducible therefrom
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under varying circumstances that we have decided, to adopt it, as we do the conclusion that,
under the facts of this case, interest runs only
from the date of the judgment herein. It reads:

4

(7) Where the commonwealth delays the
assessment, the taxpayer should be charged with
interest only from the time of the assessment.
.

*##
4

The allowance of interest is, in the last
analysis, by way of penalty upon the property
owner, for having done that which he ought not
to have done. The history of this case has been
very unusual. When it is considered that the tax
supervisors, with the advice of the state revenue
authorities, were responsible for the failure of a
timely assessment early in 1918, and thereby
forced the administrator into prolonged litigation, which included a justifiable defense against
a totally unwarranted charge of delinquency and
claim to enormous penalties, it would seem inequitable to charge the administrator with offensive delay, and to impose upon it the payment of
- interest from a date earlier than this, the first
assessment of the properties. These conclusions
seem to accord with the philosophy of the four
opinions hereinbefore digested. ***' "
I t was said in Re Clark, 105 Mont. 401, 74 P.
2d 401, 114 A.L.R. 496, that:
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n

«#** w e think this contention has been most
effectively disposed of in the case of In re Estate
of Irwin, 196 Cal. 366,237 P. 1074,1078 wherein the
court said: 'If the proviso be construed to mean
"any or all litigation," it would necessarily follow7
that even a litigant who had successfully proved
in court his contentions as to the invalidity of a
tax imposed would be liable for the imposition of
the interest of 10 per cent, as a penalty for submitting his objections to a court for adjudication,
for even successful litigation would be "litigation
to defeat the payment of a tax/' Such a result
would obviously be an absurdity/ "
"The Arkansas Supreme Court has reached
the same conclusion in the construction of a similar statute in the case of State v. Lane, Executor,
134 Ark. 71, 203 S. W. 17. See, also, In re Duncan's
Estate, 119 Wash. 426, 206 P. 1."
In State v. Certain Lands in Redwood County,
40 Minn. 512, 42 N.W. 473, at 476-7-8; affirmed in
159 U. S. 526, 16 S. Ct. 83, 40 L. ed. 247:
«### rp0 r e n ( j e r a person chargeable with
interest there must be a promise, express or implied, to pay it, or some default of duty on his
part in not sooner paying the money. Sibley v.
Pine Co., 31 Minn. 201, 17 N.W.Kep. 337. # # # If,
under such circumstances, in the absence of any
default on his part, the legislature can impose
interest retrospectively, there is no reason why
it might not also impose certain penalties for the
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nonpayment of the tax, for both stand, in this
respect, on the same footing. Both are in the
nature of damages for a default of legal duty. ***
"*** One thing is very certain: that a penalty
in any form cannot be imposed until a party is in
default in some legal duty. A penalty for the nonpayment of a tax cannot be imposed until the person has an opportunity to pay it, and fails to do
so. What we have heretofore said regarding 'interest' is equally applicable to penalties. Now,
as the whole tax extended against a tract of land
is an entirety, the owner cannot pay a part of it
without paying the whole, and if a part of it is
illegal, and he pays the whole, ordinarily it would
be a voluntary payment, and he could not recover
back the illegal part. Hence in such case his only
remedy is to wait until proceedings are commenced to enforce judgment against his land, and
then defend against the illegal part of the tax,
and until it is deducted by the judgment of the
court he has had no opportunity to pay the valid
pg,rt of the tax, and consequently has been guilty
of no default."
State v. Hughes Brothers Timber Company, 163
Minn. 4, 203 N.W. 436 at 438; reversed in 272 U. S.
469, 47 S. Ct. 170, 71 L. ed. 359, on the ground that
tlie property taxed was in interstate commerce:
"The original assessment was on 10,000 cords,
but in fact there were only 8,367 cords. The tax
: was reduced accordingly by the decision below,
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but, notwithstanding, the statutory interest and
penalties were sustained as to the reduced
amount. In that we think there was error. Under
the principle of County of Eedwood v. Winona &
St. Peter Land Co., 40 Minn. 512, 41 N. W. 465,
42 N. W. 473, neither interest nor penalties can
be imposed upon the taxpayer until he defaults in
payment. Defendants had no opportunity to pay
the correct amount of the tax until it was determined. Until then they were not in default, so all
they can be held for is interest on the tax from the
time it was so determined. ***
«##* ^ e a r e n o w c o n c e r n e ( j w i ^ default in
payment, and there was no such default until the
correct amount was ascertained, and that was not
until the filing of the order for judgment."
State v. Great Northern Railway Company, 160
Minn. 515, 200 N. W. 834, at 839:
"The right of the state to assess omitted earnings is not questioned.
"The statute provides for a direct penalty of
5 per cent, and an interest penalty of 1 per cent,
a month. The assessment was against the Great
Northern for all of the years from 1901 to 1912
inclusive. The draft was drawn for that amount
including penalty and intereat from April 23,
1913, the date of the enactment of the statute.
It was largely in excess of the .amount actually
due. The defense was justifiable; and in part
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successful. There was no opportunity to pay the
amount due without paying the excessive amount
claimed. Interest and a penalty should not be
imposed. County of Redwood v. Winona, etc., 40
Minn. 512, 41 N. W. 465, 42 N. W. 473; U. S. Trust
Co. v. New Mexico, 183 U.S. 535, 22 S. Ct. 172,
46 L. ed. 315; Gallup v. Schmidt, 154 Ind. 196,
56 N. E. 443; Lake Shore, etc., v. People, 46 Mich.
193, 9 N. W. 249.
"It was provided by Laws 1917, c. 398 (Gen.
St. Supp. 1917, §§ 90-1 to 90-3) among other
things, that uncollected drafts then in the hands
of the Attorney General should be delivered to
the treasurer. The treasurer was authorized to
receive part payment. The state insists that after
this statute the interest penalty should commence.
We do not take this view."
United States Trust Co. v. New Mexico, 183 U.
S. 535, 22 S. Ct. 172, 46 L. ed. 315:
"Until the amount of legal taxes was definitely ascertained, the owners of this property
had no opportunity of paying such taxes, and
were therefore not in default in not paying; hence
the claim for back interest is not a valid one. ***
"*** The owners of the road were therefore
justified in contesting their liability to such
assessment and taxation in gross, and until there
was an identification of the property subject to
taxation and a determination of the amount of
taxes due, it would be inequitable to charge penalties for nonpayment. ***
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"Viewing the proceedings from an equitable
standpoint, we see no error in refusing interest
prior to the decree."
CONCLUSION

The decision of the Commission is contrary to
the provisions of the statute imposing the Utah
State Franchise Tax; if given effect, it would deprive Kennecott of its property without due process
of law and would impose an undue burden on inter*
state commerce in violation of the Utah and Federal
constitutions. Accordingly, the decision of the
Commission should be reversed by this Court
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